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FEDERAL REGULATION OF HOURS AND WAGES
Herbert Burstein*
T HE EXPANDING frontier of governmental participation in
economic affairs is marked most clearly by the presence of
social welfare legislation. A growing recognition that the economy
is not self-regulating, an acknowledgment of public responsibility
for the economic security of its citizens, is reflected in the in-
creasing number of laws governing the terms and conditions of
employment. In this area, indeed, government stands as a third
party to practically every employment agreement, whether indi-
vidual or collective in character. Illustrations of the role played
by the government appear through a series of statutes, of which
the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
represent a most significant milestone in the history of progres-
sive legislation. In the interest of providing a complete picture
of federal regulation, however, it is proposed to bring together
all of the statutes enacted to date which bear on the subject.
* Member, New York and Federal Bars; Member, Department of Economics,
Long Island University; Lecturer, City College of New York and Practicing Law
Institute.
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I. THE, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS A cr
The Fair Labor Standards Act' is essentially social welfare,
rather than economic, legislation. It is, as the United States
Supreme Court has said, primarily "humanitarian and remedial"
in character, being designed "to extend the frontiers of social
progress." ' 2 While conceived as a governmental weapon for the
combatting of unemployment during a depression, its limited
coverage,3 and Congressional reliance upon minimum hourly wage
rates to insure "all able-bodied workmen and women a fair day's
pay for a fair day's work," 4 operated to impair its effectiveness
as a method of spreading employment and assuring stable and
adequate earnings. But the achievements under the statute must
not be obscured. To a considerable extent, the elimination of
sub-standard wages and of artificially created geographic differ-
entials represents a substantial contribution made by law to a
stable economy. With the addition of certain wages and hours
provisions, a framework for comprehensive legislation not only
in the field of wages and hours but also in that of employer-
employee relations has now been established.
Basically, the statute now operates by fixing a floor on wages
and a ceiling on hours, but it is important to observe that the
law does not apply to industries, as such. On the contrary, it
regulates only the wages and hours of employees engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce or in the production of goods for
1 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. A. § 201 et seq., as amended by the Act of June 26,
1940, Pub. Res. No. 38, 76th Cong., 3rd Session; by Reorganization Plan No. 2,
60 Stat. 1095; by the Portal to Portal Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 84; and by the Fair
Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, Pub. L. 393, 81st Cong., 1st Session, 63 Stat.
910. The original act was held valid in United States v. Darby Lumber Company,
312 U. S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941), and in Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., v.
Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 61 S. Ct. 524, 85 L. Ed. 624 (1941).
2 A. H. Phillips, Inc., v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490 at 493, 65 S. Ct. 807 at 808, 89
L. Ed. 1095 at 1098-9 (1945).
3 Approximately 1,700,000 workers are said to have received wage increases be-
tween 1938 and 1948, but it cannot be established that these upward adjustments
would not have occurred despite the presence of the statute. See Monthly Labor
Review, Sept., 1948, p. 272.
4 A. H. Phillips, Inc., v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490 at 493, 65 S. Ct. 807 at 808,
89 L. Ed. 1095 at 1098 (1945).
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commerce. 5 Determination as to whether or not the Act applies,
that is whether a given employee is covered thereby, requires
that inquiry be directed to the activities of the employee rather
than to the nature of the business of the employer." That point
being settled, the impact of the statute may be studied more
closely.
The law originally provided for a minimum hourly wage of
25¢ for all employees in interstate commerce or engaged in the
production of goods for interstate commerce, and fixed the maxi-
mum work week at forty-four hours.7  Beginning in 1940 and up
until January 25, 1950, the minimum wage was set at 40¢ and
the weekly maximum was fixed at forty hours.8 At the present
time, no covered employee may be paid less than 75¢ per hour
nor may he be employed in excess of forty hours a week unless
he receives one and one-half times his regular rate of pay for
all hours worked in excess thereof. Overtime compensation,
i. e., time and one-half the regular rate of pay, must be paid in
each week that it is earned as the employer is denied the right to
average the hours over two or more weeks.9 Stated differently, an
employee who works forty-two hours in any one week and only
thirty-eight in the next, must be paid overtime compensation for
the two additional hours of the first week although the total
529 U. S. C. A. § 207, subsection (a). The 1948 act extended coverage to em-
ployees engaged in incoming foreign commerce: Statement of House Conferees,
H. R. 1453, 81st Congress, pp. 13-4.
6 Some tests for determining coverage appear in Higgins v. Carr Brothers Co.,
317 U. S. 572, 63 S. Ct. 337, 87 L. Ed. 468 (1943), and in Walling v. Jacksonville
Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564, 63 S. Ct. 332, 87 L. Ed. 460 (1943).
7 The Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1062-3, 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 206(a) and 207(a),
provided for an automatic increase in minimum wages from the prior schedule as
well as for automatic reduction in the number of hours at the expiration of the
periods enumerated therein.
s See 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 206(a) (3) and 207(a) (3).
9 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 206(a) (1) and 207(a), as amended. See also 29 Code Fed.
Regs. § 778.2(d) ; 15 Fed. Reg. 623. A consideration of these sections appears in
the case of Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missell, 316 U. S. 572, 62 S. Ct. 1216,
86 L. Ed. 1682 (1942), and in comments by Brundage, "Labor Law: 'Regular Rate'
of Pay Under Section 7(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938," 34 Calif.
L. Rev. 227, and Burstein, "The Mystery of the Missing Regular Rate of Pay,"
3 Lawyers G. Rev. 411. A complete review of methods for computing overtime
compensation is set out in 29 Code Fed. Regs. § 778.3(a) and (b), subsections (1)
to (5).
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laboring time for the entire period does not exceed the statutory
count.
Again, the regular rate of pay is not necessarily the mini-
mum 750 per hour prescribed in the Act. It is arrived at, gener-
ally, by dividing total weekly earnings by the number of hours
worked. Thus, an employee receiving $40 a week for a regular
forty-hour week has a regular pay rate of $1.00 per hour, so that
his overtime rate is $1.50 for each overtime hour. If such an
employee were to work forty-two hours, his total compensation
would be $43, from which fact suggested formulae for the purpose
of computing pay may be stated as follows:
wages w
(1) Regular rate of pay=- or r -
hours h
3
(2) Total pay - 40r + - r [H-40]
2
In the application thereof, however, it should be remembered that
certain payments made to employees, such as gifts or irrevocable
contributions to "welfare" programs, are to be excluded from the
computation of the regular rate of pay.l0
The federal law does not purport to limit the number of
hours during which an employee may work so, assuming no pro-
hibitory state legislation on the subject, he could work seven days
a week and twenty-four hours a day so long as he receives the
stipulated overtime compensation rate of one and one-half times
the regular rate of pay for all hours over forty. Similarly, the
law does not place a rigid limit on the benefits which the em-
ployee may receive for his overtime work. If, for example, a
union contract or some other state or federal law should provide
him with greater benefits, these beneficial provisions control the
situation, the extra compensation afforded thereby being offset
against the overtime compensation due under the wage and hour
provisions." In much the same way, special payment for work
1029 U. S. C. A. § 207(d).
11 Ibid., § 207(d) and § 218.
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done on a Saturday, Sunday, holiday, or on the sixth and seventh
days of a work week, so long as the premium rate is not less than
one and one-half times the regular rate of pay, with a like pre-
mium rate of pay for work outside the basic, normal or regular
work day of not exceeding eight hours, or a work week of not
exceeding forty hours, paid pursuant to an employment or col-
lective labor contract, may be credited against the overtime com-
pensation due.
12
Not all employees engaged in commerce or the production of
goods for commerce are covered by the Act, for specific exemp-
tions as to certain workers have been written into the law. Ac-
cordingly, government workers, 13 executive, professional, and
administrative employees, being those who qualify under regula-
tions promulgated by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour
Division, 14 and employees engaged in retail or service estab-
lishments where more than fifty per cent of the annual dollar
volume of sales of goods or services is made within the state
in which the establishment is located, are entirely removed from
under the statute.15  Seamen 16 and employees in defined fishing
activities, 17 agricultural and horticultural workers,' 8 as well as
those employed in the operation and maintenance of ditches,
canals, and the like, provided the latter are not owned or operated
for profit,'9 are excluded. Apprentices and learners, to an extent
prescribed by the Administrator, 20 employees of a weekly, semi-
weekly or daily newspaper of limited circulation, 21 and employees
12 Ibid., §207(d)(6) and (d)(7).
13 Ibid., § 202(d).
14 Ibid., § 213(a) (1).
15 Ibid., § 213(a) (2).
16 Ibid., § 213(a) (14).
17 Ibid., § 213(a) (5).
18 Ibid., § 213(a) (10). As to the power of the Administrator to define an "area
of production" in connection with the agricultural exemption, see Addison v. Holly
Hill Fruit Products, 322 U. S. 607, 64 S. Ct. 1215, 88 L. Ed. 1488 (1944).
19 Ibid., § 213(a) (6).
20 Ibid., § 214.
21 Ibid., § 213(a) (8). The circulation limit is 4000 copies, to be distributed
primarily in the county where published or printed and in counties contiguous
thereto. See also, Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U. S. 178, 66 S. Ct. 511,
90 L. Ed. 607 (1946), and Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 66
S. Ct. 494, 90 L. Ed. 614 (1946).
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of street, suburban and interurban electric railways, or the like,22
are wholly exempt, both as to hours and wages. Certain em-
ployees whose hourly service is regulated by other statutes are ex-
empt from the hour provisions only, 23 while still others, being those
who are employed in seasonal work2 4 or who work under labor
contracts which guarantee a minimum number of weeks of em-
ployment within a prescribed period, 25 are partially exempted
from the overtime compensation provisions.
Obviously, then, an employee working for a telegraph, tele-
phone or interstate transportation company would be engaged
directly in interstate commerce26 and, absent any specific exclu-
sion from the coverage of the Act, would be entitled to full benefit
of the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions. 27 Workers
employed in manufacturing, processing and distributing the goods
which move in interstate commerce are likewise covered and, in
this latter category, fall not only those who participate in the
actual physical work on the product itself but also those employees
who work "in any closely related process or occupation directly
essential" to the production of goods for interstate commerce,
i. e., clerks, messengers, maintenance and custodial employees
and the like. 28  A freight elevator operator, for example, who
serves to carry raw material up to a manufacturing plant in the
building for processing into finished goods, which goods are then
22 Ibid., § 213(a) (9).
23 Ibid., § 213(b). See, for example, 49 U. S. C. A. § 304(a) (2), as to employees
of motor carriers coming under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, and 45 U. S. C. A. § 181 et seq., as to employees of air carriers.
24 Ibid., § 207(b) (3).
25 Ibid., § 207(b) (1) and (b) (2).
26 29 Code Fed. Regs. §§ 776-776.11; 12 Fed. Reg. 4583.
27 See J. F. Fitzgerald Constr. Co. v. Pedersen, 324 U. S. 720, 65 S. Ct. 892, 89
L. Ed. 1316 (1945) ; McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U. S. 491, 63 S. Ct. 857, 87 L. Ed. 1538
(1943) ; Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U. S. 125, 63 S. Ct. 494, 87 L. Ed.
656 (1943).
2S Before 1949, the words "necessary to production" had been employed. Cover-
age thereunder was extended to a wide variety of occupations, of which Martino v.
Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U. S. 173, 66 S. Ct. 379, 90 L. Ed. 603 (1946);
Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U. S. 126, 65 S. Ct. 165, 89 L. Ed. 118 (1945) ; and
Roland Electric Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657, 66 S. Ct. 413, 90 L. Ed. 383 (1946),
are but illustrations. The present statute reflects an attempt to limit coverage,
according to Statement of House Conferees, H. R. 1453, 81st Congress, pp. 14-5.
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to move in interstate commerce, has been said to be covered on
the theory that his work is "directly essential" to the production
of such goods.2"
A simple test of coverage has been said to lie in the ques-
tion: Does the employer intend, hope or have reason to believe
that his goods will move in interstate commerce ? If the answer
is in the affirmative, then coverage is present. To illustrate: If
a man be employed in drilling a well in an effort to discover oil,
he is covered even though, as is true in most cases, the well turns
out to be dry and the employee actually lacks a direct connection
with the production, sale or distribution of oil. The theory sup-
porting that view rests on the idea that the employer knew, or
should have known, that if oil had been extracted from the well it
would have been shipped in interstate commerce.3 0  Upon such
reasoning, few except those specifically exempt are excluded from
coverage if they engage in work of productive character. On the
other hand, those whose work is remote from the processes of
production will, in all probability, not be entitled to the benefits
here provided.
Numerous devices have been developed by employers with a
view to evade statutory requirements or to minimize their im-
pact. Of these, only one arrangement, the so-called "Belo
Plan,"' 31 received any sanction at the hands of the courts and it
has been expressly included in the Fair Labor Standards Act
as presently constituted.3 2  Under this program, where, in fact,
29 Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U. S. 679, 65 S. Ct. 1223, 89 L. Ed. 1865 (1945);
Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517, 62 S. Ct. 1116, 86 L. Ed. 1638 (1942).
30 Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U. S. 88, 63 S. Ct. 125, 87 L. Ed.
83 (1942). The burden of proving an exemption rests upon the employer, accord-
ing to Walling v. General Industries Co., 330 U. S. 545, 67 S. Ct. 883, 91 L. Ed.
1088 (1947).
31 See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U. S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 6,
91 L. Ed. 3 (1946); Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp., 316 U. S. 624, 62 S. Ct. 1223,
86 L. Ed. 1716 (1942). Compare with Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U. S.
427, 65 S. Ct. 1246, 89 L. Ed. 1711 (1945), and Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds
Hardware Co., 325 U. S. 419, 65 S. Ct. 1242, 89 L. Ed. 1705 (1945). A review
of the decision in the Belo case and of its implications appears in Dodd, "The
Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941-1945," 59 Harv. L. Rev. 321 (1946).
See also, Levy, "Belo Revisited," 15 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 39 (1946).
3229 U. S. C. A. § 207(e). A detailed statement of the operation thereof is set
forth in 29 Code Fed. Regs. § 778.18 and §§ 778.21-778.22.
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an employee's hours of work fluctuate and are irregular, an indi-
vidual or collective labor contract may be entered into to limit
overtime earnings and to stabilize weekly compensation if the
agreement specifies a regular rate of pay of not less than 750
an hour, provides compensation at not less than one and one-half
times such rate for all hours worked in excess of forty in any
work week, and provides a weekly guarantee of pay for not more
than sixty hours based on the specified rates. In the absence of
such an agreement, an employee who works a fluctuating number
of hours in the work week is entitled to time and one-half the
regular rate of pay, computed on the basis of hours actually
worked and the weekly salary actually received in each and
every week.
For example, if an employee earns $42 a week, and in one week
works forty-two hours, but in the second works forty-eight, he
would have a regular rate of pay which would vary from $1.00
in the first week to 87 ¢ per hour in the second. In the absence
of agreement, such an employee would be legally entitled to a
payment of $43 for the first week33 and $45.496 for the second.
3 4
However, if the Belo contract had been entered into, the employer
could provide a regular rate of pay of 80¢ an hour, with a guar-
antee of $44 per week. Under such circumstances, the employees
might work up to fifty hours without receiving total compensation
in excess of the guaranteed pay, 3 and he would have to exceed
fifty hours before he would be entitled to higher compensation.
Decisions rendered prior to the 1949 amendment, would seem to
indicate that the regular rate of pay fixed by such an agreement
would have to be realistic in character.36 If, for example, a cov-
ered employee were to receive $150 a week and work a fluctuating
number of hours ranging up to sixty per week, it would be un-
33 That computation is based on 42 times the regular rate of $1.00 per hour, plus
two hours of premium pay calling for an additional fifty cents per hour.
34 Calculation is based on 48 times the net rate of $.875 per hour, plus eight
hours of premium pay involving the additional compensation of $.437 per hour.
35 The statutory formula for computing the weekly wage would be [50x$.80]
plus [10 x $.40], or $44.00.
36 See cases cited, note 31 ante.
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realistic, arbitrary and unreasonable to provide for a regular
hourly rate of pay of 80 per hour.
37
Of special significance are the child labor provisions of the
law, albeit they do not deal directly with questions concerning
either hours or wages. No producer, manufacturer or dealer,
says the statute, shall ship or deliver for shipment in commerce
any goods produced in an establishment situated in the United
States in or about which, within thirty days prior to removal of
such goods therefrom, any "oppressive child labor has been em-
ployed. ' 3s  The Secretary of Labor, or a representative desig-
nated by him, is allowed to make all investigations and inspec-
tions concerning the employment of minors and, subject to the
direction and control of the Attorney General, may bring actions
to enjoin the shipment or delivery of goods in commerce when-
ever oppressive child labor has been employed. 9
The determination as to what shall constitute "oppressive"
child labor has been left to the Secretary of Labor for promulga-
tion by regulation. With limited exceptions, he may prohibit
absolutely the employment of minors under the age of fourteen,
may limit the nature of employment for those between fourteen
and sixteen, and proscribe the employment of minors between
sixteen and eighteen in certain occupations. 40 The curtailment of
oppressive child labor extends to parental employment of chil-
dren under sixteen in an occupation found by the Secretary of
Labor to be hazardous for children between the ages of sixteen
and eighteen.4 1
Fortunately for commerce generally, an exemption from
prosecution under the child labor provisions is granted whenever
37 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U. S. 199, 67 S. Ct. 1178, 91 L. Ed.
1432, 169 A. L. R. 1293 (1947).
3829 U. S. C. A. § 212(a). Under § 212(c), added in 1949, no employer may
"employ any oppressive child labor in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce." See 63 Stat. 917.
39 Ibid., § 212(b).
40 Regulations to that end have been adopted: Child Labor Regulation No. 3, 29
Code Fed. Regs. §§ 441.1 to 441.11, as amended by 11 Fed. Reg. 177A-346 and 15
Fed. Reg. 395.
4129 U. S. C. A. § 203(1).
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a shipment or delivery for shipment of goods is made by a pur-
chaser who has acquired them in good faith reliance upon written
assurance from the producer, manufacturer or dealer that the
goods were produced in compliance with the law. The exemption
is granted only to one who has paid value for the goods without
notice of the violation.
42
Except as to the child labor provisions, all matters relating
to the administration and enforcement of the statute are vested
in the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the De-
partment of Labor, an official appointed by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate.43 He is empowered to
enforce the law through investigatory procedures, 44 by criminal
prosecutions instituted by the Department of Justice,45 and by
civil suits which he is authorized to bring to restrain violations
of those provisions falling under his jurisdiction. 4  While em-
ployees may bring their own suits to recover unpaid minimum
wages, overtime compensation, and additional amounts for liqui-
dated damages, 47 claims which the Administrator may not include
as parts of an injunction proceedings, he may sue for unpaid
minimum or overtime compensation upon the written request of
an employee. 48 Nothing, therefore, touching on enforcement, has
been left to chance.
Prior to the passage of the portal to portal pay sections,4
9
42 Ibid., § 212(a). But see Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U. S. 490,
65 S. Ct. 335, 89 L. Ed. 414 (1945).
43 Ibid., § 204.
44 Ibid., § 211(a) and § 212(b).
45 Ibid., § 216(a).
46 Ibid., § 217.
47 Ibid., § 216(b). Under the provisions of the portal to portal pay sections, 29
U. S. C. A. § 258, interpretations of the Administrator have been made binding as
defenses in actions for overtime compensation and liquidated damages. A detailed
statement of the effect these sections have on the other sections of the Fair Labor
Standards Act is set forth in Statement of the Administrator, 29 Code Fed. Regs.
§§ 790.1-790.29. A review of the powers of the Administrator thereunder is
provided by Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 320 U. S. 134, 65 S. Ct. 161, 89 L. Ed.
124 (1944); United States v. American Trucking Association, 310 U. S. 534, 60
S. Ct. 1059, 84 L. Ed. 1345 (1940).
48 29 U. S. C. A. § 216(c).
4.9 61 Stat. 84, 29 U. S. C. A. § 251 et seq. See also, Ray, "The Portal to Portal
Act of 1947," 20 Tenn. L. Rev. 151 (1947), and note in 48 Col. L. Rev. 443.
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various employees had instituted law suits to recover compensa-
tion for preliminary and postliminary work, that is for certain
productive activities which began before the actual work of the
employee was entered upon, including walking time and dressing
time, and for post-productive activities engaged in subsequent to
the time such regular work ceased. All such suits were based on
the theory that, if the regular shift of an employee began at eight
in the morning and terminated at five in the afternoon, an em-
ployee who spent from five to ten minutes walking to his job site
or preparing his machine prior to eight o'clock or who spent time
after five in clean-up activities, was entitled to be paid for such
work. Suits totalling several billions of dollars, based upon this
theory, had been instituted.50
The object of the portal to portal sections was to bar recovery
therein unless the activities were compensable by contract, custom
or practice in effect at the time the activity occurred and then
only provided the activity was engaged in during the time "with
respect to which it was so made compensable." 51 In addition to
creating new defenses for employers in actions to recover liqui-
dated damages,5 2 the statute established a uniform statute of
limitations for the bringing of suits, 5 3 authorized certain types
of releases by employees of their claims for liquidated damages,
54
permitted the compromise of employees' claims for overtime
compensation, 55 and generally broadened the authority of the Ad-
ministrator.
50 See Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U. S. 446, 68 S. Ct. 1186, 92 L. Ed.
1502 (1948), particularly note 7. The principle of pay for preliminary and post-
liminary work had been established in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328
U. S. 680, 66 S. Ct. 1187, 90 L. Ed. 1515 (1946). The enactment of the new statute
put an end to many of the pending actions, but the constitutionality of this retro-
active ban on wage claims has not been passed upon by the United States Supreme
Court. Constitutionality has been found present in Battaglia v. General Motors
Corporation, 169 F. (2d) 254 (2d Cir. 1948), and in Rogers Cartage Co. v. Reynolds,
166 F. (2d) 317 (6th Cir. 1948).
5129 U. S. C. A. § 252, subsections (a) and (b).
52 Ibid., §§ 259-60.
53 Ibid., § 256.
54 Ibid., § 253(b) and § 253(c).
55 Ibid., § 253(a). The state of the law on this point, prior to the addition to
the statute, is illustrated by Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 224 U. S. 697, 65
S. Ct. 895, 89 L. Ed. 1296 (1945).
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Because the original act contained no definition of the term
"regular rate of pay," a considerable amount of litigation was
generated by varying constructions of that term. Efforts at clari-
fication produced the "Overtime on Overtime" Act,56 directly
responsive to the acute situation created by the decision in the
so-called Longshoremen's Cases, official entitled Bay Ridge Op-
erating Company v. Aaron,57 wherein the Supreme Court held,
in substance, that a premium paid for work performed after five
o'clock in the afternoon or done on Saturdays, Sundays and holi-
days, was required to be included in computing the regular rate of
pay. While that statute has since been repealed, its provisions have
been incorporated in the 1949 amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 58 so that the law, as presently constituted, forbids
the imposition of any liability for failure to pay for overtime work
if the compensation actually paid is at least equal to that payable
according to the statute.
Some miscellaneous provisions of the statute possess special
interest. The law provides for the appointment of special in-
dustry committees to recommend minimum rates of wages for
employees in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands ;59 it establishes
rules respecting piece-rate compensation ;60 it authorizes investiga-
tions into conditions of employment of persons in home work;61
and it requires the maintenance of records, by the employer, cover-
ing wages and hours as well as conditions and practices of employ-
ment.6 2  The Administrator, in addition to his broad investigatory
powers, has the right to utilize the services of state and local
agencies, in order to assist him in carrying out his functions and
duties.6 3
56 Pub. Law 177, c. 352, 81st Congress, 1st sess.
57 334 U. S. 446, 68 S. Ct. 1186, 92 L. Ed. 1502 (1948).
58 29 U. S. C. A. § 216b.
69 Ibid., § §205(a) and 206(a) (2) and 206(c).
60 Ibid., § 20Y(f).
61 Ibid., § 211. See also § 211(d). The power of the Administrator to establish
regulations on homework is discussed in Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U. S. 244, 65
S. Ct. 605, 89 L. Ed. 921 (1945).
62 Ibid., § 211(c).
63 Ibid., § 211(b).
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This, then, comprehends the principal and most far-reaching
statute enacted to date, but it does not cover all situations, nor
is it designed to apply in the area of the relationship between the
government and its own employees, much less those who indi-
rectly work for it. Such persons have not been left without pro-
tection, however, for another group of statutes apply to them.
II. WAGES AND HOURS UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS.
Early efforts by government, both federal and state, to es-
tablish minimum standards for employment had consisted almost
exclusively in legislative reductions in the hours of employment.
The wage implications of such statutes were to be found, first,
in provisions requiring the maintenance of wages notwithstand-
ing a reduction in the hours of employment, and second, in the
imposition of a requirement for payment of extra compensation
for overtime work. Historically, the establishment of scales for
minimum wages and for maximum hours dates back to 1840
when, by executive order, President Van Buren fixed a ten-hour
day for workers in the federal navy yards.0 4 The next attempted
step forward came, in 1868, when Congress enacted an eight-hour
law for all laborers, workmen and mechanics employed by the
federal government.0 5  This major piece of legislation was
vitiated by a decision of the United States Supreme Court which
upheld individual contracts calling for a longer work day, 6 and
by an interpretation of the statute by the Attorney General which
sapped the remaining vitality of the law.
6 7
While progress in this direction was delayed thereby, em-
ployees in the Government Printing Office as well as letter car-
riers were granted an eight-hour day by 1888 and, four years
64 Commons, Documentary Hist. of Amer. Industrial Society, Vol. VIII, pp. 85
and 97. An interesting review of the literature relating to early laws appears in
Kelly, "Early Regulation of Hours of Labor in the United States," 3 Ind. and Lab.
Rel. Rev. 362.
65 See Act of June 25, 1868, c. 72, 15 Stat. 77; R. S. § 3738.
66 United States v. Martin, 94 U. S. 400, 24 L. Ed. 128 (1877). See also United
States v. Martin, 10 Ct. Cl. 276 (1874).
67 14 Op. Atty. Gen. (U. S.) 37 (1872).
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later, the same work day limitation was extended to all workers
and mechanics employed by contractors and sub-contractors en-
gaged on federal projects. 6 8  An Hours of Service Act, 69 pro-
hibiting the employment of trainmen for longer than sixteen
consecutive hours, was passed by Congress in 1907, to be fol-
lowed, in 1916, by the Adamson Act which fixed the working
period for interstate train service employees at eight hours per
day.
70
In the meantime, Congress had prescribed, subject to broad
exceptions, that an eight-hour provision should be incorporated
in all contracts made by, for or on behalf of the federal govern-
ment, including its territories, possessions and the District of
Columbia, whenever such contracts called for the employment of
laborers and mechanics. The overwhelming depression provided
impetus for an Emergency Relief and Construction Act, en-
acted in 1932, under which a thirty-hour week was prescribed
"so far as practicable and feasible," 71 and that requirement was
carried forward in Title II of the ill-starred National Industry
Recovery Act.
72
Congress was still of the opinion that regulation on the
subject had not proceeded far enough so, in 1935, it empowered
the President, by the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, 73
to fix maximum hours on work relief and other comparable work
projects and, in that year, it authorized the Interstate Commerce
Commission to promulgate regulations establishing maximum
hours of service for employees of interstate motor carriers whose
activities directly affected the safety of their operations. 74
The capstone of all this federal legislation on the subject of
wages and hours was provided by the Walsh-Healey Public Con-
68 See Act of August 1, 1892, 27 Stat. 340, which, as amended, is now included
in 40 U. S. C. A. §§ 321-5.
69 March 4, 1907, c. 2939, 34 Stat. 1415; 45 U. S. C. A. § 61 et seq.
70 Sept. 3, 1916, c. 436, 39 Stat. 721; 45 U. S. C. A. § 65 et seq.
71 July 21, 1932, c. 520, 47 Stat. 709.
72 June 16, 1933, c. 90, 48 Stat. 195.
73 April 8, 1935, c. 48, 49 Stat. 115.
74 August 9, 1935, c. 498, 49 Stat. 543; 49 U. S. C. A. § 301 et seq.
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tracts Act of 1936.75 While that statute is administered by the
Wage and Hour Division and Public Contracts Division, the
Secretary of Labor is the administrative officer who is authorized,
after public hearing, to issue minimum wage determinations.
76
He is also the person authorized to grant exceptions when
"justice and proper interest will be served thereby."
77
The object of the act, briefly stated, is the elimination of the
purchase of sweat-shop goods by the government as well as the
elimination of the evils of bid brokerage and bid peddling. By
establishing decent conditions of employment in its own projects,
the government becomes the model for private employers, for the
law specifically prohibits industrial homework on all government
contracts.
The act is designed to apply (a) to specific classes of workers,
and (b) to contracts for the manufacture or furnishing of mate-
rials, supplies, articles or equipment, in any amount exceeding
$10,000, made by any executive department of the United States,
by any independent establishment or agency thereof, by the
District of Columbia, and by any corporation whose stock is
beneficially owned by the United States. All contracts entered
into by suppliers and manufacturers calling for payments in excess
of the minimum figure must contain certain specified provisions,
among which the most important is an undertaking that all
persons employed by the contractor to manufacture or furnish
such materials will be paid not less than the minimum wage which
the Secretary of Labor determines is the prevailing wage for
persons employed in the particular or similar industry or group
of industries operating in the locality in which materials are to
be manufactured or furnished. In addition, no part of the con-
tract may be performed, and none of the materials manufactured
or furnished may be produced, in any plant or factory or under
75 June 30, 1936, c. 881, 49 Stat. 2036, as amended; 41 U. S. C. A. § 35 et seq.
A review of the scope of the statute may be found in Endicott Johnson Corp. v.
Perkins, 317 U. S. 501, 63 S. Ct. 339, 87 L. Ed. 424 (1943), and in Perkins v.
Luken Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113, 60 S. Ct. 869, 84 L. Ed. 1108 (1940).
76 41 U. S. C. A. § 38.
77 Ibid., § 40.
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working conditions which are unsanitary or hazardous or danger-
ous.
Under regulations promulgated by the Secretary, no person
may be employed for more than eight hours in one day or more
than forty hours in one week unless such person receives com-
pensation at the rate of time and one-half the regular rate of pay
for all hours in excess of the daily figure or in excess of the
weekly total, whichever is greater. In this connection, it may be
noted that the overtime provisions are more favorable to the
employee than those contained in the Fair Labor Standards Act
as it affects private work. If, for example, an employee works
three days of ten hours each in a single week, he will have no
claim for overtime compensation under the latter statute, but
would be entitled to six hours of overtime under the Walsh-
Healey Act as that law requires that he be paid at overtime rates
for all hours in excess of eight per working day.
Of further significance is the absolute prohibition contained
therein against the employment, by a contractor, of males under
the age of sixteen and females under the age of eighteen, together
with a similar prohibition against the use of convict labor. For
minor males over sixteen and females over eighteen, the Secre-
tary of Labor is empowered to issue regulations governing the
conditions of their employment.
Again, when it comes to computing the regular rate of pay,
the provisions of the Portal to Portal Pay Act, noted above, are
made applicable to cases falling under this statute. It has been
suggested that the defenses therein provided, i. e., good faith
reliance upon an administrative ruling, which may save the
employer from a violation of the Portal to Portal Pay Act, are
likewise available to contractors charged with violations of the
Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act. Not so certain is the appli-
cability of a two-year statute of limitations found in the Portal
Act, for it does not appear that an employee may institute a
civil suit against the contractor in the same manner as is appli-
cable to violations of the minimum wage and overtime provi-
sions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
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Violations of the statute are made subject to severe penalties.
Not only are damages recoverable by the United States Govern-
ment,78 but the Secretary of Labor may order the payment to
the employee of any deductions, rebates, refunds or underpay-
ments of wages due him, provided the employee makes a claim
within the time prescribed by the statute. The government may
also cancel any contract because of such violations and place the
violator on a black-list which will exclude him from obtaining
other government contracts for a period of three years from the
date when the Secretary of Labor determines that a violation has
occurred.79
The authority vested in the Secretary of Labor, under this
act, to establish minimum wages for work performed in connec-
tion with government contracts is not only unique but is also of
considerable economic significance. When, in 1949, the Secretary
of Labor established minimum wages for employees in the iron
and steel industries which ranged from $1.04 to $1.25 per hour,
the industry criticized the move as setting a pattern for collective
bargaining as to non-governmental work. In 1950, following the
pattern laid out by the 1949 amendment to the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, the Secretary of Labor prescribed that no wage rate
lower that 750 an hour could be paid to any covered employee en-
gaged in performance of work on a government contract. These
moves have tended to generate pressure for an overall minimum
pay rate and it may not be long before the lever of governmental
standards will operate to raise the compensation of all wage
earners.
The Walsh-Healey Act does not purport to cover all em-
ployees, 0 nor does it apply to all governmental purchases. 8 '
Thus, it is not applicable to purchases of materials that are
78 Ibid., § 36. The section provides for the recovery of liquidated damages in
addition to all other damages arising from a breach.
79 Ibid., § 37. Distribution of the black-list so prepared is handled by the
Comptroller-General.
50 Ibid., § 35(b). Se also Matter of Casey Jones, Inc., Admin. Dec. No. PC-104,
under date of April 18, 1946.
81 Ibid., § 43.
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usually bought in the open market or to perishables, including
dairy, livestock and nursery products, or to the carriage of
freight or personnel by vessel, airplane or other media of trans-
portation where tariff rates are on file. Speaking generally, the
act applies only to those employees who are engaged in or con-
nected with the manufacture, fabrication, assembling, handling,
supervision, or shipment of materials, supplies, articles, or equip-
ment required under contract. It does not, therefore, apply to
such persons as office or custodian workers, electricians, engi-
neers, firemen, maintenance men, telephone operators, among
others. These exemptions have been specifically set forth in the
regulations, rulings and interpretations issued by the Secretary
of Labor, by the Administrator of the Public Contracts Division,
and in the opinions of the Solicitor.
Perhaps the most important exemption arises out of the
recognition it affords to specific types of collective bargaining
agreements. Under an amendment to the Walsh-Healey Act,
the overtime requirement need not be met where the employer
has entered into a collective bargaining agreement which has been
certified to be bona fide by the National Labor Relations Board, if
such agreement provides that the employees shall not be employed
more than 1,000 hours, during any twenty-six consecutive
weeks or, if on an annual basis, for not more than 2,080 hours in
any period of fifty-two consecutive weeks. Where such contracts
are effective, overtime compensation need be paid only on work
done in excess of twelve hours a day or fifty-six hours in any
given week.
2
Although the primary statute on wages and hours for per-
sons engaged in federal projects, or for those whose products are
consumed by the federal government, is the Walsh-Healey Public
Contracts Act, Congress has, from time to time, enacted other
laws bearing on the general subject, some of which are designed
to operate in specific areas while others apply only to particular
occupations. The Davis-Bacon Act, 8 for example, requires that
82 Ibid., § 35. The statute now makes cross-reference to 29 U. S. C. A. § 207.
83 40 U. S. C. A. § 276a to § 276a-5.
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contractors and sub-contractors shall pay prevailing wage rates
to laborers and mechanics working on public buildings or engaged
in public works undertaken for the government of the United
States, whether in the continental United States or in the Terri-
tories of Alaska and Hawaii. While that law does not regulate
hours, nor provide for overtime pay, the contractor or sub-
contractor is required to make payment in full of wages based
on the rates prescribed in its contract, at least once a week, with-
out deduction or rebate, regardless of any waiver agreed to by
an employee. To assure compliance, the act requires that the
scale of wages must be posted at the site of the work.
In structure, the Davis-Bacon Act is like those already ex-
amined in that its provisions apply not to all contracts but only
to those in excess of $2,000, except that, irrespective of the size
of the contract, prevailing wages are to be paid on all defense
housing contracts. Administration of the statute is also vested
in the Secretary of Labor, who, at the request of the contracting
officer or agency, is authorized to determine and fix the prevailing
wage, for each class of labor involved, in the locality of the work
performance. Once that rate has been established, the contracting
agency must include the wage scale in the contract and supervise
the enforcement thereof. The Comptroller General may withhold
funds from the contractor found guilty of a violation and may
pay the unpaid wages directly to workers. The violating em-
ployer may also be black-listed in the fashion previously noted.
Defenses and limitations upon liability established by the Portal
to Portal Pay Act are likewise made expressly applicable to the
Davis-Bacon Act.
An even more extensive coverage for workers engaged in
the construction, repair and alteration of public buildings and
works is to be found in the Copeland Act, the so-called "Anti-
Kick-Back" law, 4 which operates without regard to any $2,000
limitation, so long as federal funds are involved. It does not
apply to work done on contracts to furnish supplies for a similar
84 Ibid., § 276b.
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protection has already been afforded under the Walsh-Healey
Act. It does, however, operate to penalize any person who, by
force, intimidation, threat of dismissal, or by any other means,
induces any person employed on a public construction work, or
on work financed in whole or in part by federal funds, to give
back any part of his compensation. Enforced by the Secretary
of Labor, 5 the statute applies to all employees, not just to
laborers and mechanics, assuring protection not only to persons
employed directly by the government but to the working forces of
contractors and sub-contractors.
The so-called "Eight Hour" law,8 6 first enacted in 1892 and
amended in 1912, prescribed a ceiling of eight hours for the
daily work of laborers and mechanics employed upon public works
of the United States, its territories, the District of Columbia, or
of any of the agencies thereof. Covered employment, in general,
includes the construction, alteration, or repair of buildings and
the construction of canals, docks, roads, water works, irrigation
works, dams and similar projects. During World War II and
for some time thereafter, the limitation on the hours of employ-
ment was waived upon condition that the contractor or sub-con-
tractor would pay time and a half for all hours worked in excess
of eight.8 7 While no special enforcing agency is provided, each
contracting agency being left responsible to see to it that com-
pliance is obtained, 8  the law is not without teeth. Violations
are punishable, at the instance of the contracting governmental
agency, at the rate of $5.00 per day per employee for each day
of violation, and this amount may be withheld. In addition, in-
tentional violations are punishable by fine and imprisonment.
Again, there is no conflict of coverage between this statute and
the Walsh-Healey Act, for supply contracts are exempted.
Those supply contracts which do not involve more than $10,000
are excluded while those in excess of that figure come within the
85 Ibid., § 276c, as amended May 24, 1949, by 63 Stat. 108.
8640 U. S. C. A. §§321-5.
87 Ibid., § 326.
88 Ibid., § 324.
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provisions of the last mentioned statute. If, in the case of con-
tracts other than those for the supplying of materials, there
should be conflict between the two laws, the Walsh-Healey Act
is to prevail.
Mention has been made of the fact that, under the Motor
Carrier Act, 9 the Interstate Commerce Commission has been
authorized to establish qualifications and maximum hours of serv-
ice for all employees whose work is directly connected with safety
of operations. Acting pursuant to such authority, the Commis-
sion, by regulation, has prescribed a maximum of sixty hours in
one week, which week shall consist of one hundred sixty-eight
consecutive hours commencing from the time the driver reports
for duty in interstate commerce other than in certain specifically
exempted operations.90 The rules allow a carrier who operates
vehicles seven days a week to permit his drivers to remain on
duty for a total of not more than seventy hours in any period of
one hundred ninety-two consecutive hours. To ensure compli-
ance, special driver's reports as well as monthly reports of driv-
ing time must be maintained and filed.
To this already wide category of statutory regulation must
be added other fragmentary legislation on the subject. The
Mineral Land Lease Act, 91 for example, requires that every lease
of mineral and oil lands given by the United States shall con-
tain a provision limiting the work day to eight hours for under-
ground workers while at the same time prohibiting the employ-
ment of males under the age of sixteen, and the employment of
females without regard to age, in any underground mine. The
Federal Airport Act,92 applicable to all contracts in excess of
89 49 U. S. C. A. § 301 et seq., particularly § 304(a) (2). On the point as to the
exemption of motor carrier employees from the operation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, se Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U. S. 695, 67 S. Ct.
954, 91 L. Ed. 1184 (1947); Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U. S. 649,
67 S. Ct. 931, 91 L. Ed. 1158 (1947) ; Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U. S.
44, 63 St. Ct. 917, 87 L. Ed. 1244 (1943).
90 Ex parte No. MC-2, I. C. C., Jan. 27, 1939, effctive March 1, 1939, 4 Fed. Reg.
475, as amended in 5 Fed. Reg. 3900.
91 30 U. S. C. A. § 187.
92 49 U. S. C. A. § 1114.
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$2,000 on projects approved by the Civil Aeronautics Adminis-
tration, calls for the insertion in such contracts of a schedule of
minimum rates of wages to be paid to skilled and unskilled labor.
Authority is vested in the Secretary of Labor to determine the
minimum level of wages, an authority comparable to that given
him under the Walsh-Healey Act. Contracts granting financial
aid to the several states for the construction of low-cost housing
projects must, according to the Housing Act of 1949, 93 contain
provisions assuring the payment of prevailing wages and salaries
in the locality in which the project is to be developed. The power
to establish the level of prevailing salaries to be paid to archi-
tects, technicians, engineers and draftsmen so employed is given
to the Housing and Home Financing Administration, but the level
of prevailing wages as to other workers is to be determined by
the Secretary of Labor pursuant to his powers under the Davis-
Bacon Act.
Legislation calling for the payment of minimum wages might
still be defeated by the financial inability of the employer to pro-
vide funds sufficient for the purpose. Evils which developed in
connection with the performance of public contracts, growing
out of the failure of contractors to pay wages, led to the enact-
ment of the Heard Act.9 4 That statute requires that, in every
contract exceeding $2,000 for the construction, alteration or re-
pair of any public building or public work of the United States,
the contracting party must furnish a performance bond designed
to benefit the government and a payment bond for the protection
of persons furnishing material and labor. Extension of that
statute into other areas where government contracts are con-
cerned would serve to round out the protection offered to workers
by law.
Land workers are not the only ones protected, for merchant
seamen are also covered by an eight-hour law,9 5 and only an
93 42 U. S. C. A. § 1401 et seq., particularly § 1416.
94 40 U. S. C. A. §§ 270a-270d. In connection therewith, see Standard Accid. Ins.
Co. v. United States, 302 U. S. 442, 58 S. Ct. 314, 82 L. Ed. 350 (1938).
9546 U. S. C. A. § 673.
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emergency can serve to excuse non-compliance therewith. Viola-
tion on the part of the master of the vessel is punishable by a
penalty not to exceed $500 and the seaman is entitled to his dis-
charge and all wages earned.
It may be seen, from this synopsis of legislation, that the
pattern of regulation of wages and hours, established by the
government, has developed empirically and has taken a dual
form. It has been built up along the line of general legislation
with a limited economic perspective on the one hand while also
establishing delegated authority to administrative agencies in
fields affected with a national or a public interest on the other.
If, indeed, wages and hours are the core of industrial relations
and the mainspring of labor economic processes, the whole course
of legislation in this field points out new areas in which even
more democratic and economic progress can yet be made.
APPORTIONMENT OF TAX EXEMPTIONS
GRANTED CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS
Franklin M. Crouch*
INCREASES in the burdens of taxation, together with decreases
in income from endowments and the like, have apparently
driven charitable, educational, and other nonprofit corporations
to seek every advantage from tax exemption laws while, at the
same time, causing them to press for added sources of income.
Without attempting to discuss the situation which has arisen in
the field of federal income taxation growing out of the acquisition
of business enterprises by organizations formed on a not for
profit basis, there is evidence of a similar development in the
field of state taxation, particularly as it concerns the imposition
of property taxes on realty owned by such eleemosynary bodies
when used in part for charitable or public purposes but devoted,
at least in part, to the production of revenue. Noteworthy in that
direction is a series of recent cases originating in Ohio together
with one decision to be found in Minnesota, the import of which
prompts an inquiry into the possibility of securing either a
total exemption from taxation or, if that proves impossible, then
the obtaining of at least an apportionment of the exemption
pro-rata according to the extent to which some charitable use
is made of the premises.
Three recent Ohio cases serve to highlight the problem, for
the highest court of that state appears to be sharply divided over
the right to an exemption unless the property is used totally and
exclusively for charitable purposes. In the case of City of Cleve-
land v. Board of Tax Appeals,1 for example, a municipal stadium,
located on land owned by the city, together with four adjacent
parking areas, was held to be subject to tax, for the reason that
* LL.B., Chicago-Kent College of Law; Member, Illinois Bar.
1- Ohio St. -, 91 N. E. (2d) 480 (1950). Zimmerman, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion, as did also Taft, J. The dissenting opinion of the latter was concurred
in by Stewart, J.
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the same was not operated exclusively for public purposes, even
though the properties had been acquired with the proceeds of
bonds charged against the general tax revenues supplied by the
inhabitants of the city. Although a majority of the judges con-
cerned agreed that the derivation of an incidental revenue from
the publicly owned property would not be sufficient to alter its
public character, the record indicated that only one use had been
made of the stadium in question during the taxable year with-
out the making of an admission charge, in contrast to some one
hundred other uses at a fee which had netted the municipality
a substantial profit before allowances had been made for de-
preciation and debt retirement.
Of comparable character is the case of Cleveland Osteopathic
Hospital v. Zangerle2 in which tax exemption of the corporate
realty was denied when it appeared that the hospital operated
at a profit from fees and other charges for professional services
rendered by staff osteopathic physicians and surgeons who were
its regular employees, albeit all such profits were allocated to
the purpose of retiring mortgage indebtedness and the enlarge-
ment of the hospital facilities. The majority of the court, again,
were of the opinion that the exclusive operation of the property
for charitable purposes necessary to secure tax exemption did
not require that the hospital be entirely devoted to the admis-
sion of patients without charge, yet such care for the poor, needy
and distressed had to be an important objective and could not be
overshadowed by a design to make a substantial profit. That
design, the majority said, would tend to negative the idea that
the hospital was a benevolent institution. The minority judges,
recognizing that not even a charity could operate indefinitely
at a loss, were of the opinion that the hospital was a charitable
corporation so long as it did not operate simply as a device to
channel profits to its stockholders or promoters.3
2- Ohio St. -, 91 N. E. (2d) 261 (1950). Taft, J., wrote a dissenting opinion,
concurred in by Hart and Stewart, JJ.
3 An exemption from personal property taxation was sought in the case of
American Jersey Cattle Club v. Glander, 152 Ohio St. 506, 90 N. E. (2d) 433 (1950),
wherein an association formed as a nonprofit corporation for the purpose of "im-
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In the third case, that of Western Reserve Academy v. Board
of Tax Appeals, 4 a nonprofit corporation operating a college pre-
paratory school had erected homes on land owned by the cor-
poration, adjacent to the campus, to be occupied by certain of
its faculty members rent free. In return for such use and occu-
pation, the faculty members were expected to render supervisory,
tutoring and coaching services, of benefit to the academy stu-
dents, within the premises so furnished. A denial of tax ex-
emption was upheld on the theory that the buildings were not
used exclusively for charitable purposes, since the thought of
private residence was incompatible with the idea of public benefit. 5
The chance of presently sustaining a tax exemption in Ohio, then,
unless the charitable use is not only clear but is also virtually
exclusive, is extremely slender.,
Contrast to these Ohio cases is provided by the decision of
the Minnnesota Supreme Court in the case of Christian Busi-
ness Men's Committee of Minneapolis, Inc. v. State.7 The charity
proving the breeding of Jersey cattle in the United States," had a net income after
operational expenses had been paid, which net had been taxed on the basis that
the club was "engaged in business" as that term was defined in Ohio Gen. Code
1946, § 5325-1. The tax commissioner had proceeded on the theory that as certain
of the club's activities brought it into competition with recognized commercial
enterprises it was not operated or organized exclusively for charitable, scientific,
educational or public purposes within the meaning of Ohio Gen. Code 1946,
§ 5328-1a. The Ohio Supreme Court so held and denied the claimed tax exemption.
4 - Ohio St. -, 91 N. E. (2d) 497 (1950). Justices Stewart and Taft each
wrote dissenting opinions.
5 The fact that faculty salaries would have been increased had not such resi-
dential quarters been provided may have had some bearing on the decision of the
majority.
6 The split in the Ohio Supreme Court is further illustrated by the decision in
Applications of University of Cincinnati, - Ohio St. -, 91 N. E. (2d) 502 (1950),
wherein a tax exemption was granted as to certain improved parcels of realty,
held in trust for the benefit of the university, the rental income from which was
applied exclusively to its use, endowment and support, whereas certain vacant
lots, not then used by the university, were held taxable for the reason that they
were not then contributing in any way to the support of the institution. Con-
siderable doubt was there expressed as to the validity of Ohio Gen. Code 1946,
§ 4003-15, creating a special exemption in favor of educational institutions, but
inasmuch as the concurrence of a sufficient number of the judges to a declaration
of invalidity, made necessary by Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 2, could not be obtained,
the statute was held valid.
7 228 Minn. 549, 38 N. W. (2d) 803 (1949). The court was obliged to interpret a
statute which declared: "All property described in this section to the extent
herein limited shall be exempt from taxation: (1) All public burying grounds;
(2) All public school houses: (3) All public hospitals; (4) All academies, colleges
and universities, and all seminaries of learning; (5) All churches, church property
and houses of worship; (6) Institutions of purely public charity; (7) All public
property exclusively used for any public purpose .... See Minn. Stats. Ann.
1947, § 272.02, which codifies the language found in Minn. Const. 1857, Art. IX, § 1.
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there concerned, after acquisition of ownership of certain real
property, sought to have the property declared exempt from
real estate taxation. The property in question consisted of a
three-story building, a connected two-story garage, and an ad-
joining one-story structure located in a downtown business dis-
trict. The street floors and the basement area of one of the
buildings were leased to commercial tenants but the remaining
portions were used for such activities as a service men's hos-
pitality center, for youth activities, for religious broadcasts con-
ducted under the auspices of the petitioner, and to provide meet-
ing places for other organizations interested in promoting the
Christian way of life. The portions under lease to commercial
tenants were eventually to be converted to the corporate char-
itable and religious uses when the existing leases expired. A
denial of an exemption, based on the theory that the property
in question had not been used exclusively for purely public char-
itable purposes, was reversed on the ground that it was not neces-
sary to treat the buildings as a single unit but that the same
could be assessed and taxed on that portion of the total assessed
valuation allocated to the taxable use, after deduction of the
value of the portion thereof properly allocated to the tax exempt
use. The divergent views so noted add point to an investigation
into the possibilities for the apportionment of the tax exemp-
tion which may be granted to a charitable corporation.
It can be said, at the outset, that every jurisdiction in the
United States has, to some degree, made provision by law for
the granting of a tax exemption to benevolent, charitable or
religious organizations. The fundamental ground of all such
tax exemptions, where allowed, is said to be the reciprocal of
the benefit conferred upon the community by such charitable and
benevolent institutions in relieving the state, at least to some
extent, of the burden which rests upon it to care for, and to
advance the interests of, its citizenry." On this foundation are
9 See 61 C. J., Taxation, § 499.
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predicated both constitutional9 and statutory ° authority for
tax exemption in the various jurisdictions. In the absence thereof,
the property of a charitable institution, like any other property,
would be subject to taxation. But these provisions vary widely,
not only in the matter of their language but also in the construc-
tion placed thereon as the result of judicial interpretation.
In the main, like the basis to be found in Minnesota," these
exemption provisions require that there be a concurrence of (1)
ownership of the property by the charitable institution or ben-
evolent organization and (2) the use thereof for the proper pur-
poses of the organization. There are thirty-six states' 2 together
with the District of Columbia in this category. The remaining
twelve states 3 make charitable use the only test, disregarding
9 Ala. Const. 1901, Art. IV, § 91; Ark. Const. 1874, Art. XVI, § 5; Cal. Const.
1879, Art. XIII, §§ 1 and 1c; Col. Const. 1876, Art. X, § 5; Fla. Const. 1887, Art.
XVI, § 16; Ga. Const. 1877, Art. II, § 5002; Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IX, § 3; Ky. Const.
1891, § 170; La. Const. 1921, Art. X, § 4; Minn. Const. 1857, Art. IX, § 1; Mo. Const.
1875, Art. X, § 6; Mont. Const. 1889, Art. XII, § 2; Neb. Const. 1875, Art. XIII,
§ 2; Nev. Const. 1864, § 145(1) ; N. Mex. Const. 1911, Art. VIII, § 3, N. C. Const.
1876, Art. V, § 5; Okla. Const. 1907, Art. X, § 6; Pa. Const. 1874, Art. IX, § 1;
S. C. Const. 1895, Art. X, § 4; Tex. Const. 1876, Art. VIII, § 2; Utah Const. 1895,
Art. XIII, § 3; Va. Const. 1902, § 183; Wash. Const. 1889, Art. VII, § 3.
10 Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 51, § 2; Ariz. Code 1939, § 73-201; Ark. Stats. 1947,
§ 84-206; Cal. Rev. and Tax Code, Div. 1, Part 1, Ch. 1, Art. 1, § 206; Conn. Gen.
Stats. 1949, Tit. 15, Ch. 100, § 2027; D. C. Code, Tit. 47, Ch. 8, § 47-801; Del. Rev.
Code 1935, Ch. 44, § 1285; Ga. Code 1933, §§ 2-5002 and 92-201; Ida. Code 1949,
§ 63-105; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 500; Burns' Ind. Stats. 1944, Ch.
81, § 6; Flack Md. Code Ann. 1939, Art. 81; Mass. Laws Ann., Ch. 59, § 5; Mich.
Stats. Ann. 1945, Ch. 59, § 7.7(4); Minn. Stats. Ann. 1947, § 272.02; Miss. Code
Ann. 1942, Tit. 39, § 9697; Mo. Rev. Stats. Ann. 1943, Ch. 74, § 10937; Mont. Polit.
Code Ann. 1935, Ch. 183, § 1998; Neb. Rev. Stats. 1943, Ch. 77, § 202; Nev. Comp.
Laws Ann. 1929, §§ 6418(5) and 6630; N. H. Rev. Laws 1942, Ch. 73, §§24-6; N. J.
Stats. Ann. 1949, Ch. 54.4-3.6; McKinney's N. Y. Consol. Laws Ann. 1943, Tax Law,
Art. 1, § 4; N. C. Gen. Stats. 1943, Ch. 105, § 296(6); N. D. Rev. Code 1943,
§ 57-0208(8); Page's Ohio Gen. Code Ann. 1946, § 5353; Okla. Stats. Ann., Tit.
68, § 15.2; Ore. Comp. Laws 1947, Ch. 110, § 201(3); R. I. Gen. Laws 1938, Ch. 29,
§ 2; S. C. Code 1942, Ch. 108, Art. 3(3), § 2578; S. D. Code 1939, § 57.0311(3b) ;
Williams Tenn. Code Ann. 1934, Tit. V, Art. IV, § 1085; Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stats.
Ann., § 7150(7) ; Utah Code Ann. 1943, Tit. 80, Ch. 2, § 1; Vt. Stats. 1947, Tit. 8,
Ch. 37, § 662; Remington Wash. Rev. Stats. Ann. 1932, Tit. 78, Ch. 3, § 11111;
W. Va. Code 1943, Tit. 11, Ch. 3, § 9; Wis. Stats. 1947, Ch. 70, § 70.11; Wyo. Comp.
Stats. Ann. 1945, Ch. 32, § 104.
11 Minn. Const. 1857, Art. IX, § 1; Minn. Stats. Ann. 1947, § 272.02.
12 Ariz., Ark., Cal., Del., Fla., Ga., Ida., Ill., Ind., La., Me., Mass., Mich., Minn.,
Miss., Mo., Neb., Nev., N. H., N. J., N. Y., N. C., N. D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Pa.,
S. C., S. D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Vt., Va., Wash., Wis. The constitutional and
statutory citations have been set forth in notes 9 and 10, ante. Reference here-
after to a particular state by name is intended to incorporate the pertinent con-
stitutional and statutory provisions already cited.
13 Ala., Colo., Conn., Iowa, Kan., Ky., Md., Mont., N. Mex., R. I., W. Va., Wyo.
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questions of ownership, for not a single state regards owner-
ship alone as sufficient ground on which to base the privilege of
tax exemption.
Clearly, therefore, little attention need be given to questions
of ownership, for these questions may be easily resolved, in any
specific instance, by an inspection of title records, for instru-
ments such as deeds, trust agreements, and the like, vesting title
in the charitable corporation, are usually recorded. The real
issue in any particular case will usually turn on whether or not
the use or uses to which the property in question is put can
be said to serve a charitable or benevolent purpose. Where the
property is used wholly for charitable purposes there will, usu-
ally, be no difficulty in fitting it into the tax exemption frame.
With equal facility, it can be determined that property used en-
tirely for other than a charitable purpose is not entitled to ex-
emption from taxation. Difficulty is manifested, however, when
a particular parcel of real estate is put, in part, to a charitable
use while other parts thereof are used for non-charitable purposes.
Three possibilities of solution may be offered to the last-
mentioned problem. The first of them is to grant, on the basis
of the partial charitable use, a total exemption from taxation.
At the other extreme lies the second possible solution, that is to
tax the whole of the property as if it were entirely commercially
owned and used. The third possibility, occupying a middle ground
between these two extremes, would apportion the property, for
tax purposes, according to the degree of the charitable and non-
charitable uses to which it is put and make an allocation of the
exemption accordingly. Legislative recognition of the problem
seems to exist in only twenty-four of the states14 and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. In thirteen of these jurisdictions,' 5 there is
no provision for apportionment. In the remaining twelve,'16 the
14 Ark., Cal., Fla., Ida., Ind., La., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Miss., Neb., N. Y.,
Ohio, Pa., S. D., Tenn, Utah, Vt., Va., Wash., Wis., Wyo. References concerning
these states may be found in notes 17, 19 and 20, post.
15 Ala., Cal., Del., Ill., Iowa, Ky., Mo., N. J., N. M., N. C., N. D., Okla., and Tex.
See notes 9, 10, 17, 25, 29, and 30 through 38, inclusive.
16 Ariz., Conn., Ga., Kan., Me., Mont., Nev., N. H., Ore., R. I., S. C., W. Va.
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question apparently has not arisen directly, for no cases bear-
ing directly on the point may be noted.
A study of the law of these jurisdictions wherein a pro-rata
apportionment is made according to use reveals that this result
obtains from either of two sources. The first of these sources
lies in the statutory exemption provision itself. Twelve juris-
dictions, including the District of Columbia,'17 may be grouped
under this heading. Typically, these statutes first declare that
property belonging to charities and used for the purposes for
which such charities were organized is to be exempt from tax-
ation, except that, if the property belonging to the charitable
institution is used for business purposes from which a revenue
is derived, it shall then be taxed as is true of any other prop-
erty. Succeeding the last-mentioned proviso is a clause which
grants the right of apportionment. 8 It logically follows, there-
fore, that such statutory provisions leave almost nothing for
the courts to do so far as the law is concerned. 19 What little
work there is would seem to consist solely of the determination
as to whether or not the particular use is or is not a charitable
or a benevolent one.
20
The second source is to be found in judicial interpretations
given to statutory exemption provisions which are, of themselves,
17 Cal. Const. 1879, Art. XIII, §§ 1/2 and 1c; D. C. Code, Tit. 47, Ch. 8, § 47-801;
Ida. Code 1949, § 63-105; Burns' Ind. Stats. Ann. 1933, § 63-201; Mass. Laws Ann.,
Ch. 59, § 5; McKinney's N. Y. Consol. Laws 1943, Tax Law, Art. 1, § 4; S. D. Code
1939, § 57.0311(3) ; Williams Tenn. Code Ann. 1934, Tit. V, Art. IV, § 1085; Vt.
Stats. 1947, Tit. 8, Ch. 37, § 662; Va. Const. 1902, § 183; Remington Wash. Rev.
Stats. Ann. 1932, Tit. 78, Ch. 3, § 11111; Wis. Stats. 1947, Ch. 70, § 70.11.
18 By way of example, Williams Tenn. Code Ann. 1934, Tit. V, Art. IV, § 1085,
declares that the exemption shall extend to: "The real estate owned by any
religious, charitable... institution and occupied by such institution . . . exclusively
for carrying out thereupon one or more of the purposes for which the institution
was created or exists ... The real property of any such institution not so used...
shall not be exempt; but if a portion only of any lot or building of any such institu-
tion is used exclusively for .. . such purposes, then such lot or building shall be so
exempt only to the extent of the value of the portion so used."
19 Of the states possessing such provisions, New York spells the text out in the
greatest detail. See McKinney's N. Y. Consol. Laws Ann. 1943, Tax Law, Art. 1,
§ 4. The language there used would appear to be a codification of the early deci-
sions of that state. No cases in point involving the present provision have been
noted.
20 The exemption provisions in California and Virginia declare that the legisla-
tures thereof may, by special act, provide for total or partial tax exemption. The
Vermont statute is unique in that the town in which the property is situated may
vote for an exemption thereof, either in whole or in part.
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silent as to apportionment. Under this heading may be found
some twelve states, 2 1 including Minnesota, and the case noted
above from that jurisdiction may be said to be representative
of the decisions to be found in the other jurisdictions falling
in this category. These courts have concerned themselves pri-
marily with the question as to whether or not the property has
been devoted to a proper use and have reached the obvious con-
clusion that, at least in part, it was so exclusively used for pur-
poses within the statutory provision, albeit in part it was not.
In each instance, both parts have comprised substantial portions
of the real estate although none have involved the peculiar part-
time commercial use, developed for the municipal stadium, that
is observable in the Ohio case of City of Cleveland v. Board of
Tax Appeals, 22 for the business use has been based on a reason-
ably permanent basis. Where that exclusive use of a substan-
tial portion of the real estate for benevolent or charitable pur-
poses has been found to exist, such portion of the real estate
has been held to be pro-rata exempt from taxation while the
remainder of the property, being that portion used primarily
for revenue purposes, has been declared pro-rata taxable.
The reason underlying decisions of that character is best
expressed in the words used by the Minnesota court in the case
mentioned. It said that although
it is a general rule that constitutional provisions exempting
property from taxation are to be strictly construed, such
provisions, though not subject to extension by construction
or implication, are to be given a reasonable, natural and
practical interpretation in the light of modern conditions to
effectuate the purpose for which the exemption is granted.
23
21 See Burbridge v. Smyrna Baptist Church, 212 Ark. 924, 209 S. W. (2d) 685
(1948) ; Simpson v. Bohon, 159 Fla. 280, 31 So. (2d) 406 (1947); Cunningham v.
Board of Assessors, 52 La. Ann. 223, 26 So. 872 (1898) ; Baltimore v. Grand Lodge,
60 Md. 280 (1883) ; Detroit Young Men's Society v. Detroit, 3 Mich. 172 (1854)
Business Men's Christian Ass'n v. State, 228 Minn. 549, 38 N. W. (2d) 803 (1949)
Y. M. C. A. v. Lancaster County, 106 Neb. 105, 182 N. W. 395 (1921); Masonic
Temple Craft v. Bd. of Equalization, 129 Neb. 293, 261 N. W. 569 (1935) ; Phila-
delphia v. Barber, 160 Pa. 123, 28 A. 644 (1894); Odd Fellows Bldg. Ass'n v.
Naylor, 53 Utah 111, 177 P. 214 (1918) ; I. 0. 0. F. of Casper v. Scott, 24 Wyo. 544,
163 P. 306 (1917). Ohio belonged herein prior to the decisions noted above.
22 See note 1, ante.
23 228 Minn. 549 at 559, 38 N. W. (2d) 803 at 811.
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To the extent that the community receives a direct benefit flow-
ing from that part of the property which is used exclusively
by the charitable organization, relieving the state of its burden
to that extent, such part should be exempt from the burden of
taxation. Where part of the property is devoted to the deriva-
tion of revenue, however, any benefit which flows to the com-
munity is, at best, indirect and remote and the purposes under-
lying the exemption are served, if at all, in a second-hand fashion.
Denial of an exemption in such cases, at least to the extent the
property is held for revenue production, is warranted.
Other jurisdictions have refused to recognize apportionment
as a solution to the problem of whether or not to tax the prop-
erties of charitable or benevolent institutions. They have, there-
fore, adopted one or the other of the remaining possible solu-
tions, that is total exemption or total non-exemption. Thirteen
states 24 fall in this category and the decisions therein range from
the most strict to the most liberal of statutory interpretations.
Of all the cases noted, those from New Jersey appear to dem-
onstrate the least liberal attitude. The statute of that state
requires that, in order to qualify for tax exemption, the property
must be both owned and used exclusively for charitable purposes.
25
The language thereof is not much different from that of the
Minnesota statute, but the New Jersey courts have repeatedly
emphasized that the use must be exclusive and nothing else will
suffice. Illustrative thereof is the holding in the case of Trus-
tees of the Young Men's and Young Women's Hebrew Associa-
tion of Newark v. State Board of Tax Appeals.26 The building
there concerned was used almost entirely for charitable or re-
ligious purposes by the Hebrew Association, but another organi-
zation was permitted to maintain its offices therein. The court
held that there was no entitlement to tax exemption since the
building was not used exclusively for purposes calculated to im-
24 Ala., Colo., Del., Iowa, Ky., Mo., N. J., N. Mex., N. C., N. D., Okla., and Tex.
Cases from these jurisdictions are cited in the succeeding footnotes.
25 N. J. Stats. Ann. 1949, Ch. 54.4-3.6.
26 119 N. J. L. 504, 197 A. 372 (1938), affirmed in 121 N. J. L. 65, 1 A. (2d) 367
(1938).
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prove the moral or mental outlook of the members of the asso-
ciation which owned the premises or of those who attended its
functions. 27  While not quite so intolerant of non-exclusive uses
for charitable purposes as is New Jersey, some seven other states
must be listed along with it, in addition to the view now being
followed in Ohio as illustrated by the cases mentioned above.
28
Slightly more liberal is the view to be found in Illinois,
which state uses what some courts have termed the primary use
test. That test was defined, in the Minnesota case above re-
ferred to, as being one in which the primary use to which prop-
erty is put determines the question as to whether it is or is not
exempt from taxation. As the court there noted, if the prop-
erty is devoted primarily to a religious or charitable purpose,
an incidental use for another purpose would not destroy the ex-
emption, but an incidental use for religious or charitable pur-
poses, of property primarily used for other purposes would
not warrant exemption. 29 Application of such a test necessarily
depends on the facts presented in any particular situation which
may be under consideration. Obviously, both the result of total
exemption or that of total taxation can be reached by its appli-
cation, and this is demonstrated by Illinois decisions on the sub-
ject.30 Other states have reached the same end without spe-
27 See also Haven of Grace v. Lakewood, 19 N. J. Misc. 414, 20 A. (2d) 518 (1941).
28 State v. Bridges, 246 Ala. 486, 21 So. (2d) 316 (1945) ; Creel v. Pueblo Masonic
Bldg. Ass'n, 104 Colo. 281, 68 P. (2d) 23 (1937) ; Readlyn Hospital v. Hoth, 223
Iowa 341, 272 N. W. 90 (1937) ; Fitterer v. Crawford, 157 Mo. 41, 57 S. W. 1134
(1900); Sir Walter Lodge v. Swain, 217 N. C. 632, 9 S. E. (2d) 365 (1940) ; Mark-
ham Hospital v. City of Longview, 191 S. W. (2d) 695 (Tex. Civ. App., 1945).
Citation to the Illinois cases is given in note 30, post.
29 See Business Men's Christian Ass'n v. State, 228 Minn. 549 at 559, 38 N. W.
(2d) 803 at 812 (1949). That test had been used in the earlier Minnesota cases of
State v. Second Church, 185 Minn. 242, 240 N. W. 532 (1932); State v. Union
Congregational Church, 173 Minn. 40, 216 N. W. 326 (1927) ; County of Ramsey v.
Church of the Good Shepard, 45 Minn. 229, 47 N. W. 783, 11 L. R. A. 175 (1891).
30 Illustrations of the application of the primary use test in Illinois may be found
in People v. Y. M. C. A. of Peoria, 157 Ill. 403, 41 N. E. 557 (1895), and in Congre-
gational Sunday School and Publishing Soc. v. Board of Review, 290 Ill. 108,
125 N. E. 7 (1919). In the first, a factual situation similar to that under considera-
tion in the principal Minnesota case led the court to hold the property was not
exempt from taxation even though the rents received were used for religious pur-
poses. In the second, the court held the properties of the Publishing Society were
exempt from taxation where the profits, if any, derived from its activities went to
aid indigent Sunday schools, since its properties were put to a charitable use. See
also Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority, 370 Il. 356, 19 N. E. (2d) 193 (1939) ;
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
cifically naming the means leading thereto as being the primary
use test.81
Left for consideration are those jurisdictions which manifest
a most liberal attitude when it comes to granting tax exemptions
for the properties of charities. Five states appear in this group
3 2
and they hold that, provided there is the requisite ownership,
a partial use for proper purposes is sufficient to exempt the en-
tire parcel of real estate from taxation. Only Delaware and
North Dakota have expressed that view in the form of exemp-
tion statutes,3 3 but the attitude has been fostered in New Mexico
both by an opinion of its Attorney General3 4 and by judicial
decision.35 Similar decisions are to be found in Kentucky36 and
Oklahoma.
3 7
It is in the latter jurisdiction that the case of State v. Bar-
tlesville Lodge No. 284, A. F. & A. M.,38 one which appears to
be best representative of the lenient view, was decided. The
property there concerned consisted of a building owned and oc-
cupied by a fraternal order as its home office, but the greater
part of the building was rented to others. The rental income
was used to further the purposes of the fraternal order except
that a part thereof went to maintain the building and to dis-
People v. Y. M. C. A. of Chicago, 365 Ill. 118, 6 N. E. (2d) 166 (1937) ; People v.
Passavant Mem. Hospital, 342 Ill. 193, 173 N. E. 770 (1930) ; People ex rel. Baldwin
v. Jessamine Withers Home, 312 Ill. 136, 143 N. E. 414 (1924) ; People ex rel.
Thompson v. First Congregational Church, 232 Ill. 158, 83 N. E. 536 (1908). But
see also Smith v. Board of Review, 305 Ill. 38, 136 N. E. 787 (1922), and First M. E.
Church v. Chicago, 26 Ill. 482 (1861), wherein the courts concerned apparently
approved a partial assessment of the properties in question.
31 See, for example, Sir Walter Lodge v. Swain, 217 N. C. 632, 9 S. E. (2d) 365
(1940).
32 Del., Ky., N. D., N. Mex., Okla. See notes 33 to 38, post.
33 Del. Rev. Code 1935, Ch. 44, § 1285; N. D. Rev. Code 1943, § 57-0208.
34 1914 Atty. Gen. Op. (N. Mex.) 225.
35 Albuquerque Lodge No. 461, B. P. 0. E. v. Tierney, 39 N. Mex. 135, 42 P. (2d)
206 (1935).
36 Church of the Good Shepard v. Comm., 180 Ky. 465, 202 S. W. 894 (1918);
Comm. v. Bd. of Ed. of M. E. Church, 166 Ky. 610, 179 S. W. 596 (1915).
37 Bd. of Equalization v. Tulsa Pythian Ben. Ass'n, 195 Okla. 458, 158 P. (2d)
904 (1945) ; Okla. County v. Queen City Lodge, 195 Okla. 131, 156 P. (2d) 340
(1945).
38 168 Okla. 416, 33 P. (2d) 507 (1934).
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charge obligations which had been incurred in the construction
thereof. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, unlike the one in Ohio
which decided the case of Cleveland Osteopathic Hospital v.
Zangerle,8 9 held the property to be entirely exempt from taxa-
tion.
If there can be said to be any majority view on the sub-
ject of tax exemption for the properties of charitable or re-
ligious organizations, when any parts thereof are used for reve-
nue production, that view is the one adopted in the Minnesota
case above referred to, one which grants a pro-rata apportion-
ment of the assessment between the charitable and the non-char-
itable uses. While it may be granted that tax exemption is not
a matter to be dealt with lightly, nor to be expanded beyond rea-
sonable and proper limits, the result there attained is not only
a practical one but one which leads to an equitable conclusion.
It is much to be preferred over the view now adopted in Ohio,
for it at least offers the non-profit organization a chance to sur-
vive, and thereby to perpetuate its good offices, in a period of
declining revenues and in the face of a drying up of the sources
of great wealth which formerly served to replenish its funds
in times of need.
39 See note 2, ante. A prior Ohio case, granting exemption even though the prem-
ises were only partly used for charitable purposes, may be observed in the decision
in Cleveland Library Ass'n v. Pelton, 36 Ohio St. 253 (1880).
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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-APPOINTMENT, QUALIFICATION AND
TENURE-WVHETHER OR NOT A TESTATOR MAY, BY WILL, DELEGATE TO AN-
OTHER THE POWER AND AUTHORITY OF NOMINATING His EXECUToR-The
Supreme Court of Montana recently had occasion to decide a relatively
rare question when it considered the appeal taken in the case of In re
Effertz' Estate.' The testatrix there concerned had, by her will, directed
that the judge of probate should appoint the nominee of the Roman
1 - Mont. -, 207 P. (2d) 1151 (1949).
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Catholic Bishop of the Diocese of Great Falls, Montana, to act as execu-
tor of her last will and testament. In accordance therewith, the Bishop
nominated the appellant to act as executor. The nominee duly and regu-
larly filed his petition for probate and requested that letters testamentary
be issued to him. The trial court ordered that the documents which pur-
ported to be the last will and testament should be admitted to probate
as such but, instead of appointing the appellant as the sole executor,
it appointed the appellant and another as joint administrators with the
will annexed and issued letters of administration accordingly. The
nominee appealed, contending that the trial court had erred in its ruling
that administration with the will annexed was proper because of the failure
of the testatrix to name an executor in the will. When reversing that
decision, the Montana Supreme Court, after a thorough discussion of the
law, by holding that the appellant should have been appointed sole exec-
utor of the estate, followed what appears to be a well-settled common law
doctrine on the subject.
The issue involved presents a problem of historical as well as legal
significance. At least one authority considers that the issue arose for
the first time during the reign of Henry VI, when wills as such were
not permitted but were accepted as testaments dealing with goods and
other chattel property. In his treatise on the general subject of execu-
tors and administrators, Sir Edward Vaughn Williams notes that Kather-
ine, Queen Dowager of England, mother of Henry VI, made a last will
and testament wherein she constituted the King as her sole executor. His
Majesty, possibly concerned with affairs of state, thereupon appointed
three noblemen to act in that capacity.2 His right so to do, of course,
would hardly be questioned by a court during that period of monarchical
supremacy.
Insofar as ordinary persons are concerned, the English ecclesiastical
courts have adhered to a doctrine, possibly stemming from that precedent,
which permits the delegation of authority over the decedent's estate. Evi-
dence thereof may be found in the case of In the Goods of Cringan,3
a case which has been noted by some legal scholars as being the earliest
authority on the present issue.4  The testator there concerned had di-
rected that the legatees should mutually appoint two intelligent and trust-
worthy persons to execute his testamentary plan. The legatees did so
nominate two persons to serve as executors and, when affirming the ap-
2 See Williams, A Treatise on the Law of Executors and Administrators (R. H.
Small, Philadelphia, 1832), Vol. 1, p. 113.
3 1 Hag. Ecc. 548, 162 Eng. Rep. 673 (1828).
4 Alexander, Commentaries on the Law of Wills, Vol. 3, § 1221; Schouler, Wills,
Executors and Administrators, 6th Ed., Vol. 3, § 1515.
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pointment, the judge said: "The provision in this will, as to the appoint-
ment of executors, I am informed, is not very unusual in Scotland . . .
However, understanding from the deputy registrar that instances have
frequently occurred of granting probate to persons nominated by those
authorized by the testator so to nominate, I shall allow this decree to
pass as prayed." ' 5  Since then, the rule that a testator may delegate to
a person or persons named in his will the power and authority of nomi-
nating his executor for him has been uniformly followed in England.'
In 1875, the English rule appears to have been introduced into this
country through the medium of the decision in the New York case of
Hartnett v. Wandell.7 In that case, the testator had nominated and ap-
pointed his wife as the executrix of his estate but had requested that
such male friend as she might desire should be appointed with her, to act
as co-executor. Upon proper compliance with this provision, the court,
in a most scholarly and elaborate consideration and discussion of the
law, held that the issuance of letters testamentary to the widow and her
nominee was valid and proper. The doctrine thus applied has been uni-
formly followed whenever the question has arisen, so it may be said that
the issue seems to be unanimously settled in the United States, as well.8
Courts have primarily based these decisions on the well-established
principle that the intention of the testator should prevail unless it should
be contrary to some law or public policy.9 For that reason, they have
5 1 Hag. Ecc. 548 at 549, 162 Eng. Rep. 673 at 673-4.
GFarnum v. Administrator General, 14 App. Cas. 651 (1889); In the Matter of
Ryder, 2 Sw. & Tr. 127, 164 Eng. Rep. 941 (1861) ; Jackson v. Paulet, 2 Rob. Ecc.
344, 163 Eng. Rep. 1340 (1851); In the Goods of Deichman, 3 Curt. 123, 163 Eng.
Rep. 676 (1842). That view has also been followed in Canada: Wright v. Stack-
house, 10 N. B. R. 450 (1863).
7 60 N. Y. 346, 19 Am. Rep. 194 (1875).
8 Thomas v. Field, 210 Ala. 502, 98 So. 474 (1923) ; Tuckerman v. Currier, 54 Colo.
25, 129 P. 210 (1912) ; Bishop v. Bishop, 56 Conn. 208, 14 A. 808 (1888) ; Kinney v.
Keplinger, 172 Ill. 449, 50 N. E. 131 (1898) ; Wilson v. Curtis, 151 Ind. 471, 51 N. E.
913 (1898) ; In re Stahl's Estate, 113 Ind. App. 29, 44 N. E. (2d) 529 (1942);
Brown v. Just, 118 Mich. 678, 77 N. W. 263 (1898) ; In re Crosby's Estate, 218
Minn. 149, 15 N. W. (2d) 501 (1944) ; Landon v. Huitfeldt, 41 N. J. Eq. 267, 3 A.
882 (1886) ; Mulford v. Mulford, 42 N. J. Eq. 68, 6 A. 609 (1886) ; In re Bergdorf's
Will, 206 N. Y. 309, 99 N. E. 714 (1912) ; Hartnett v. Wandell, 60 N. Y. 346, 19 Am.
Rep. 194 (1875) ; In re Griffin's Estate, 193 Misc. 419, 83 N. Y. S. (2d) 579 (1948) ;
In re Walsh's Will, 147 Misc. 281, 264 N. Y. S. 72 (1933) ; In re Brocato's Estate,
143 Misc. 664, 258 N. Y. S. 111 (1931) ; State v. Superior Court, 179 Wash. 198, 37
P. (2d) 209 (1934) ; Cole v. City of Watertown, 119 Wis. 133, 96 N. W. 538 (1903).
Textual material on the subject may be found in Alexander, Commentaries on the
Law of Wills, Vol. 3, § 1221; Schouler, Wills, Executors and Administrators, 6th
Ed., Vol. 3, § 1515; Williams, Executors, 12th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 132; Woerner, Adminis-
trators, 3rd Ed., § 229. Encyclopedic treatment is provided by 33 C. J. S., Executors
and Administrators, § 22c; 21 Am. Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 57, and 11
R. C. L. § 18. See also 60 Alb. L. J. 141.
9 Thomas v. Field, 210 Ala. 502, 98 So. 474 (1923); Tuckerman v. Currier, 54
Colo. 25, 129 P. 210 (1912); Bishop v. Bishop, 56 Conn. 208, 14 A. 808 (1888);
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shown great liberality in the exercise of committing the execution of a
will to the party therein intended by the testator to act as executor. 10
It cannot be contradicted that the testator is in the most advantageous
position to know how, when and by whom his estate should be adminis-
tered. To disregard the intention of the testator would, without doubt,
lead to violence and disharmony with respect to the interpretation of
the scheme employed by the testator, for a well-considered method of dis-
tribution could easily fail if executed by a total stranger.
Similarly, it can only be supposed that good reason would exist in
the mind of a testator who makes no present designation of his executor.
The person whom he might have appointed may refuse or be unable to
act, or may die before the purposes set forth in the will have been prop-
erly effectuated. If he chooses to trust to the judgment of one whom
he has authorized to make the selection for him, the confidence that he
has reposed in such other. person should not be disturbed by the courts.
In recognition of this fact, courts have consistently allowed the dele-
gation of authority to appoint an executor even where statutory material
is present which might easily have been interpreted to prohibit it. In
Thomas v. Field," for example, the testatrix empowered her two daughters
to appoint her executor and, in compliance with such authority, the daugh-
ters nominated another person to act as such. It was urged, by those
opposing the appointment, that the statutory provision which empow-
ered the court to appoint a "named" executor 2 prevented the designation
of anyone not specifically referred to by name in the will. A unanimous
decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama, validating the right to such
a delegated appointment, held that the common law power to delegate
Kinney v. Keplinger, 172 Il. 449, 50 N. E. 131 (1898) ; In re Crosby's Estate, 218
Minn. 149, 15 N. W. (2d) 501 (1944) ; In re Bergdorf's Will, 206 N. Y. 309, 99 N. E.
714 (1912). That view is also iterated in the earlier New York cases cited in note 8,
ante.
1o Kinney v. Keplinger, 172 Ill. 449, 50 N. E. 131 (1898); Hartnett v. Wandell,
60 N. Y. 346, 19 Am. Rep. 194 (1875) ; State v. Superior Court, 179 Wash. 198, 37 P.
(2d) 209 (1934).
11 210 Al-h. 502. CS S,). 474 (1923). See also Kinney v. Keplinger, 172 Ill. 449,
50 N. E. 131 (1898) ; In re Crosby's Estate, 218 Minn. 149, 15 N. W. (2d) 501
(1944); Hartnett v. Wandell, 60 N. Y. 346, 19 Am. Rep. 194 (1875). The last
mentioned case overruled the holding in In re Bronson's Will, Tucker's Rep. 464
(N. Y., 1869), which appears to be the only case holding that the common law
doctrine had been abrogated by a statute which required that the executor be named
in the will, even though the statute did not expressly purport to nullify the common
law principle.
12 Ala. Code, 1907, § 2507, then in force, declared: "Whenever a will has been
admitted to probate in this state, the judge of the court in which the will was
probated may issue letters testamentary, according to the provisions of this chapter,
to the persons named as the executors in such will, if they are fit persons to serve
as such." See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 227.
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had not been abrogated by the statute in the absence of an express provi-
sion so declaring.
After it has been determined that such a power of appointment does
exist, two questions will immediately arise, to-wit: (1) to whom may
this power of appointment be given, and (2) what restrictions, if any,
are placed upon the person exercising the power ? As to the first, courts
have been extremely liberal with respect to the person who may be given
such a power of appointment. They have allowed the power to rest in
disinterested third persons, such as the judge of probate, 3 as well as
in persons directly interested in the estate, such as the legatees. 4
Research has failed to uncover any decision which points specifically
to qualifications which may be required either of the person making the
appointment or of the appointee. Naturally, the power might be circum-
cribed by the testator, who might limit the authority to a selection be-
tween members of a designated class. If unlimited authority is conferred,
it must be remembered that specific statutory provisions exist which im-
pose qualifications on the person to be appointed as executor."5
Obviously, the estate should always be administered by a trustworthy
and competent individual, so it would be safe to say that no nominee would
secure appointment if he lacked the qualifications required by law, de-
spite the fact that he might be the designate of the person possessing
the power of appointment. Conversely, as public policy has found it
necessary to enact statutes denying to certain individuals the right to act
as executors, it would seem to follow therefrom that much the same re-
strictions might be applicable to the one empowered to appoint as apply
to the appointee. Logically, a party who is personally qualified to act
as an executor would, without doubt, choose a more competent person to
execute the will than would a person not possessed of such acceptable
moral and mental capabilities. Up to the present, however, that question
has apparently never arisen. Generally, the person given the power to
appoint may exercise it quite freely, subject to the only requirement that
the person nominated to act as executor be a suitable person.'" This,
13 Bishop v. Bishop, 56 Conn. 208, 14 A. 808 (1888) ; Brown v. Just, 118 Mich. 678,
77 N. W. 263 (1898).
'4 Thomas v. Field, 210 Ala. 502, 98 So. 474 (1923) ; Wilson v. Curtis, 151 Ind.
471, 51 N. E. 913 (1898).
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 229, for illustration, specifies that a person
is not qualified to act as executor of any will who is "of unsound mind or an
adjudged incompetent under this Act or has been convicted of a crime rendering
him infamous or is a non-resident of this State or, if a male, is less than eighteen
years of age."
16 Brown v. Just, 118 Mich. 678, 77 N. W. 263 (1898). The will there in question
placed a specific limitation to that effect.
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of course, allows great leeway in the making of a choice, so it is not sur-
prising to learn that there is one decision which holds that the appointer
may even exercise the authority in favor of himself.
17
It would appear, then, that the instant case has not only been correctly
decided but is sustained by such an overwhelming weight of authority,
supported by such satisfactory and logical reasoning, that a contrary deci-
sion would not only have been a surprising one but would have been both
unjust and impracticable.
W. E. KASKE
INFANTS--ACTIONS-WHETHER OR NOT A CAUSE OF ACTION EXISTS
IN FAVOR OF A CHILD FOR PRENATAL INJURIES INFLICTED UPON IT-Two
decisions, recently handed down by the highest courts of Ohio and Minne-
sota, revive interest in the question of the right of an infant to maintain
an action for prenatal injuries. In the first, that of Williams v. Marion
Rapid Transit, Inc.,1 a complaint filed by the infant's next friend charged
that the child's mother, then seven months pregnant, had been injured
through the negligence of the transportation company at a time when she
alighted from one of its vehicles, which injury induced a premature birth
and permanent damage to the minor plaintiff. The trial court sustained
a general demurrer to the complaint but, upon appeal, the intermediate
appellate court reversed the judgment,2 after which the record was cer-
tified to the Supreme Court of Ohio.' That tribunal held that a viable
child, injured while still in the mother's womb, could maintain a subse-
quent action against the wrongdoer. In the second case, that of Verkennes
v. Corniea,4 a father brought an action for an alleged wrongful death of
his unborn child. It appeared that the wife had entered a hospital for
purpose of confinement and delivery but, due to the alleged negligence of
the attending physician, both she and the child died. A demurrer based
on the ground that no cause of action had accrued, since the child had,
in fact, never existed as a person in being, was sustained by the trial
court. Again, on appeal, the decision was reversed, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota deciding that an infant which was capable of independent
17 In the Matter of Ryder, 2 Sw. & Tr. 127, 164 Eng. Rep. 941 (1861).
1 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N. E. (2d) 334 (1949).
2 82 Ohio App. 445, 82 N. E. (2d) 423 (1948).
3 Certification occurred because the judges of the Court of Appeals, although
unanimous in their opinion, noted a conflict with a judgment pronounced, on the
same question, in the case of Mays v. Weingarten, 82 N. E. (2d) 421 (Ohio App.,
1943).
4- Minn. -, 38 N. W. (2d) 838 (1949).
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existence, even though as yet unborn, was to be deemed a living being in
contemplation of law.
In both the cases cited, the defendant had rested on the theory gen-
erally relied upon by the majority of courts which deny a recovery, viz.,
that an unborn child is not a person in being and therefore no cause
of action can accrue to it for injuries occasioned during the period when
it is still being carried by its mother.6 This proposition appears to have
stemmed from the case of Dietrich, Administrator v. Inhabitants of North
Hampton,7 the initial decision in this country. In that case, a premature
birth was induced when the mother slipped upon a defect in the highway
of the defendant town. The child was not directly injured but, due to
the fact that it was not in an advanced stage of development, the mother
being only five months pregnant, it did not survive. An action for
wrongful death was instituted by the administrator but the court de-
nied recovery. Thereafter, a majority of the American jurisdictions took
the position that, so long as the injury occurred at any time before the
birth of the infant, no subsequent suit could be maintained, either by the
child or in its behalf.'
It has been urged from several quarters, however, that later courts
have failed to evaluate the decision in the Dietrich case properly.' The
court there specifically pointed out that the child involved was, at the
time of the accident, incapable of independent existence outside the body
of the mother and was, therefore, not viable.' ° It might logically be argued
that the decision therein stands for no more than the proposition that a
foetus which is not advanced to the stage where it can survive outside
the mother is not a person in being. As such, it could not claim legal
rights which belong to persons nor recover for injuries suffered while
5 Right to maintain a wrongful death action, stemming from the determination
that the child itself could have sued had it lived, rested upon Minn. Stat. Ann.
1947, § 573.02. That statute provides that "when death is caused by the wrongful
act or omission of any person or corporation, the personal representative of the
decedent may maintain an action therefor if he might have maintained an action,
had he lived, for an injury caused by the same act or omission."
6 See, for example, Nugent v. Brooklyn Hts. R. Co., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N. Y. S.
367 (1913), noted in 26 Harv. L. Rev. 638.
7 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
s See cases cited in note 11, post. Some of them rest directly on the Dietrich case:
Jordan v. Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 124 Tex. 347, 78 S. W. (2d) 944 (1935);
Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N. J. 455, 26 A. (2d) 489 (1942).
) See the dissenting opinion of Boggs, J., in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill.
359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900), as well as the opinion in Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138
(1946), noted in 25 CHICAGO-K ENT LAW REVIEW 162.
10 As to the medical basis for a distinction between an "embryo" and a "viable
foetus," see Am. Illus. Med. Dict., 19th Ed., pp. 483 and 1605. An embryo is a
foetus in its earliest stage of development, typically during the first three months
of pregnncy; a viable foetus is one that can live outside the utera.
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en ventre sa mere. Courts which have relied upon that case for support
in denying recovery for all prenatal injuries, regardless of the stage of
the foetal development, may well have strayed from the actual rule of the
decision therein.
Despite this, a majority of jurisdictions continue to deny to the in-
fant any right of recovery under the stated circumstances, 1 and so great
is this weight of precedent that courts have accepted it as a strict rule
of the common law to be followed without deviation.1 2  A refusal to
adopt any other position, regardless of the obvious harshness of the rule,
is generally attributed to a reluctance to engage in judicial legislation.
One court, at least, has stated that it is the duty of the legislature to
create the right and, until such is an accomplished fact, it will not permit
recovery for a prenatal injury. 3 In that regard, it is interesting to note
that judicial interpretation of a California statute,1 4 not too specific in
character, has cleared the way for the maintenance of the action in that
state,'1 5 which holding may be indicative of the eagerness with which courts
may be likely to accept such legislation and do their utmost to construe
it favorably.
Without waiting for legislation on the subject, a minority view has
been developing, to which the two cases mentioned above must now be
added, a view which would allow a child to recover for injuries inflicted
on it while en ventre sa mere."6 It is the theory of these cases that a
1 Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Branton, 218 Ala. 464, 118 So. 741 (1928);
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638, 48 L. R. A. 225, 75 Am. St.
Rep. 176 (1900) ; Smith v. Luckhardt, 229 Ill. App. 100, 19 N. E. (2d) 446 (1939),
noted in 27 Ill. B. J. 348, 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1016: Dietrich v. Northampton, 138
Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884) ; Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274
N. W. 710 (1937) ; Buel v. United Railways Co., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S. W. 71, Ann. Cas.
1914C 613, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 625 (1931) ; Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N. J. 455, 26 A.
(2d) 489 (1942) ; Ryan v. Public Service Co-ordinated Trans. Co., 18 N. J. Misc. 429,
14 A. (2d) 52 (1940) ; Drobner v. Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567, 20 A. L. R.
1503 (1921), noted in 34 Harv. L. Rev. 549; In re Roberts Estate, 158 Misc. 698,
286 N. Y. S. 476 (1936) ; Mays v. Weingarten, 82 N. E. (2d) 421 (Ohio App., 1943) ;
Berlin v. J. C. Penny Co., Inc., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A. (2d) 28 (1940); Gorman v.
Budlong, 23 R. I. 169, 49 A. 704, 55 L. R. A. 118, 91 Am. St. Rep. 629 (1901) ; H. P.
Jordan v. Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 124 Tex. 347, 78 S. W. (2d) 944, 97
A. L. R. 1513 (1935) ; Nelson v. Galveston H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 621, 41 S. W.
1021, 11 L. R. A. 391, 22 Am. St. Rep. 81 (1890) ; Lewis v. Steves Sash & Door Co.,
177 S. W. (2d) 350 (Tex. Civ. App., 1943) ; Lipp v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light
Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N. W. 916, L. R. A. 1917B 334 (1916). See also Walker v.
Great Northern Ry. Co. of Ireland, 28 L. R. Ir. 69 (1890).
12 Ryan v. Public Service Co-ordinated Trans. Co., 18 N. J. Misc. 429, 14 A. (2d)
52 (1940).
13 Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 50, 274 N. W. 710 (1937).
14 Deering, Cal. Civ. Code, § 29.
15 Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 629, 93 P. (2d) 562 (1939).
16 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (1940); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App.
(2d) 629, 93 P. (2d) 562 (1939) ; Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. (2d) 352 (La. App.,
1923) ; Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. Dist. & Co. Rep. 227, 97 A. L. R. 1525 (1924). See
also Montreal Tramway v. Le Veille, 4 D. L. R. 337 (1933).
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child which is capable of independent existence, although still within the
body of the mother, should be considered as a person in being, hence
entitled to recover for injuries which may be suffered by it at that time.'7
These opinions are quick to point out the status the unborn infant en-
joys in the fields of property law and criminal law. As to the former, a
child still carried by its mother, provided it is later born alive, is consid-
ered as in esse for every purpose which will benefit it.' In the contem-
plation of the latter, for purpose of punishing the destruction of a child,
a foetus is recognized as a living being after it has quickened or stirred
in the womb.'" There then follows the logical query, "why a part of the
mother under the law of negligence and a separate entity and person in
that of property and crime ?" 2° It has, if viable, its own bodily form and
members, manifests all of the anatomical characteristics of individuality,
possesses its own circulatory, vascular and excretory systems and is capa-
ble now of being ushered into the visible world. Why not, then, its own
separate legal personality as well?
These courts, using an approach to tort law similar to that used in
the branches of property and criminal law, would supply the final arc
to round out the legal circle of logic. They deny that there is any com-
mon-law rule which bars recovery for prenatal injuries and, when con-
fronted with the Dietrich decision, point to the fact that the child there
concerned was not viable at the time of the accident. This emphasis on
viability is strengthened by the fact that, in all of the prior minority
cases, the child was eventually born alive, while three of the decisions make
specific reference to this fact.2 1  Only in the Minnesota case noted above
has recognition been accorded to the possibility of recovery despite the
fact that the child was not born alive.
To that extent, the Minnesota case pushes the limits of the minority
17 Lamont, J., in Montreal Tramway v. Le Veille, 4 D. L. R. 337 at 344 (1933),
expressed the belief that it was "but natural justice that a child, if born alive and
viable, should be allowed to maintain an action in the courts for injuries wrong-
fully committed upon its person while in the womb of its mother." In Kine v.
Zuckerman, 4 Pa. Dist. & Co. Rep. 229, 97 A. L. R. 1525 (1924), the court proceeded
on the novel approach that the tortfeasor had set a harmful force in motion which
did not mature or have its effect until the infant was born. The time elapsing in
the interim between the infliction of the harm and birth was said to have no effect
on the cause of the injury, except as it might have evidential value in terms of
cause and effect.
15 Villar v. Gilbey, (1907) A. C. 139, Harper v. Archer, 4 Smedes & Marshall 99,
43 Am. Dec. 472 (Miss., 1845) ; Marsellis v. Thalhimer, 2 Paige Ch. 35, 21 Am. Dec.
66 (New York, 1830).
19 State v. Cooper, 2 Zabriskie 52 (N. J., 1849).
20 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 at 140 (1940).
21 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (1940) ; Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. Dist. &
Co. Rep. 227, 97 A. L. R. 1525 (1924) ; Montreal Tramway v. Le Veille, 4 D. L. R.
337 (1933).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
rule beyond the bounds of any prior decision and tends to unsettle the
whole movement for it neglects the one fundamental requirement of the
law of property on which the argument depends for its validity. It also
poses another objection in that new and confusing problems of damage
law are projected. Except as to identifiable costs of interment 2 2 by
what measuring rod may the jury determine damage in the case of a
child never actually born as a person? A jury can determine the degree
of injury to a living child and can project that degree of injury into the
future to ascertain the present worth of the future harm growing from
defendant's neglect. To attempt the same thing with respect that that
which never existed, borders on speculation so gross as to be apt to
produce an unfavorable reaction toward a developing minority view, one
more in need of encouragement than discouragement.
M. J. BARAZ
LANDLORD AND TENANT-RE-ENTRY AND RECOVERY OF POSSESSION BY
LANDLORD-WHETHER OWNER OF A PROPRIETARY LEASE TO APARTMENT
IN A CO-OPERATIVE APARTMENT BUILDING IS TO BE DEEMED A LANDLORD
UNDER THE FEDERAL HOUSING AND RENT ACT OF 1947-An Illinois re-
viewing court has now, for the first time, been called upon to determine
whether a purchaser of stock and of a proprietary lease, issued by a co-
operative housing corporation, is to be deemed to be a "landlord" within
the meaning and intent of the federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947.'
That issue, presented in the case of Kenny v. Thompson,2 grew out of a
record which disclosed that one Dr. Bokman had originally owned shares
of stock in a certain building corporation and occupied an apartment in
the building under a proprietary lease from the corporation. He later
subleased the apartment to the defendant who rented on a month to
month basis. Some years later, and at a time when the federal statute
aforementioned was in effect, Dr. Bokman sold his stock and assigned
his proprietary lease to the plaintiff. Desiring the apartment for his per-
sonal occupancy, the plaintiff gave proper notice and brought a forcible
detainer action when the defendant refused to vacate. The statute in ques-
tion prohibited eviction by a landlord, even though the tenant's lease
had expired, so long as the tenant continued to meet certain of the obli-
gations of his tenancy, but an exception therein authorized eviction where
22 The Illinois Injuries Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2, now permits
the recovery of certain itemized expenses, including funeral bills, where the decedent
leaves no widow or next of kin.
1 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix § 1881 et seq.
2 338 Il. App. 403, 87 N. E. (2d) 229 (1949).
3 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix § 1899(a).
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the landlord sought, in good faith, to recover possession for his imme-
diate and personal use and occupancy. 4  The trial court, apparently be-
lieving that the plaintiff did not qualify as a landlord within the excep-
tion noted, gave judgment for the defendant but that judgment was re-
versed on appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District of Illinois.
It is clear that, were it not for the prohibitions of the federal Hous-
ing and Rent Act of 1947, the plaintiff in the instant case would be entitled
to judgment for a local statute merely requires that the plaintiff in a
forcible entry and detainer proceeding be a person entitled to possession.5
The first question, then, is to determine what additional requirements, if
any, are imposed by the federal act. It should be noted that Section
1899(a) thereof prohibits eviction by a "landlord," although creating
an exception in his favor where he seeks possession for his personal occu-
pancy.6 If the plaintiff is deemed not to be a landlord within the meaning
of the federal statute, as the trial court held, then it would seem to follow
that the statute would not apply to him at all, thereby leaving him free
to exercise the rights he always enjoyed under state statute or by com-
mon law. Clearly, if the plaintiff did not qualify under the exception
to the prohibition, then he could not come under the prohibition itself
for, by sheer logical construction, the word "landlord" should be given
the same meaning in one part of the section as it possesses in another.
The upper court, therefore, was faced with two alternatives. It
could either rule that the plaintiff was not a landlord, that the federal
act was inapplicable, and that he was free to maintain his action un-
der the state statute; or it could hold that he was a landlord, that the
act did apply, but that he was entitled to possession under the excep-
tion. In either event, the plaintiff would have to prevail, but a reversal
based on the first alternative would lay down the undesirable precedent
that none of the restrictive provisions of the Housing and Rent Act apply
to tenants holding proprietary leases in co-operative units. The court
did, in fact, follow the second course by endeavoring to show that a co-
operative participant was in effect the "owner" of the apartment he
occupied, hence could easily qualify as a landlord. For the purpose of
this discussion, then, it is necessary to determine whether the Appellate
Court was correct in holding that a co-operative member is such an
owner.
4 Ibid., § 1899(a) (2).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 2, permits "the person entitled to possession
of lands or tenements" to be restored thereto, "when any lessee of the lands or
tenements, or any person holding under him, holds possession without right after
the determination of the lease or tenancy by its own limitation, condition, or terms,
or by notice to quit or otherwise."
6 It should be noted that the term "landlord" is nowhere defined in the federal
statute.
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A knowledge of the basic elements of the co-operative scheme is, of
course, essential to a general understanding of the problem.7  Accord-
ing to the usual plan, a corporation is formed to purchase or construct
an apartment building in which each member selects an apartment which
he may occupy exclusively as a home. For convenience, the fee title
to the property is placed in the corporation, while the corporate manage-
ment is controlled by the stockholders through a board of directors. The
two important instruments in the organization are the stock certificate
and the proprietary lease, which are inseparable at all times. A prospec-
tive member must purchase a certificate for a specified number of shares
roughly equivalent to the value of his apartment. This certificate en-
titles him to a proprietary lease, ordinarily of the long term or perpetual
type, which is evidence of his right to occupy and control a particular
apartment and sets out the respective rights and duties of lessor and
lessee. Monthly assessments are paid by each member in proportion to
his stock holdings. The corporation reserves the right to terminate the
lease for any default or violation of any covenant by the lessee. Assign-
ment of stock and lease may be made only with consent of the directors
or by majority vote of the stockholders.
Before examining these elements in further detail, an inquiry into
the real purpose behind the co-operative plan should furnish the best
clue to the problem of ownership. The rapid growth of co-operative apart-
ments in recent years must be attributed primarily to the fact that they
provide an opportunity for one to own his apartment. It cannot be em-
phasized too strongly that the very essence of the co-operative plan lies
in its design to appeal to those who desire to own, rather than merely
rent, living space. It has been repeatedly held that tenant stockholders
are concerned primarily in the purchase of a home, and that the per-
manency of the individual occupants as tenant owners is an essential
element in the general plan.8 Further advantages lie in the fact that
each tenant owner has a voice in the selection of other tenants and in the
management of the property so that, through the principle of co-opera-
tion, the common expenses of operation and maintenance of the property
as a whole may be shared by the owners. These factors, however, are
but the practical machinery for carrying on the main purpose of own-
ership and are designed to operate for the protection of the purchaser's
investment.
7 See MacChesney, The Principles of Real Estate Law (The Macmillan Co., New
York, 1928), Ch. 8. See also Castle, "Legal Phases of Co-operative Buildings," 2 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1928), and notes in 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. 532 and 3 Int. L. Rev. 131.
s Penthouse Properties v. 1158 Fifth Avenue, 256 App. Div. 685, 11 N. Y. S. (2d)
854 (1939), followed in 1165 Fifth Avenue Corporation v. Alger, 261 App. Div. 608,




Perhaps most often cited as being inconsistent with the thought of
ownership is the fact that legal title to the premises rests in the cor-
poration. A realistic approach should reveal that this seeming inconsist-
ency is a matter of form rather than one of substance. Such an approach
requires first a consideration of the alternatives that might have been
adopted. If separate deeds to each apartment were used, the objectives
of co-operation would be almost impossible to attain, evils of speculation
would be apt to arise, and there would be practical difficulties of sep-
arate insurance and tax assessment. If, on the other hand, the entire
building were to be held by the owners as joint tenants, the four unities
of time, title, interest, and possession would be impossible of achievement,
and the operation of the principle of survivorship would lead to unde-
sirable results. Tenancy in common, would be open to even more objec-
tions. Therefore, as a California case once stated, "in order to effect a
co-operative plan whereby each member might in effect own his own
apartment, and yet be subject to such rules and regulations as a majority
should deem wise and expedient, and also be subject to a sale of the
property when two-thirds of the members should so vote, it was appar-
ently deemed necessary to lodge title in an artificial person, the corpora-
tion. '"9 That court concluded that, while the corporation held legal title,
yet to all intents and purposes, the entire equitable estate was distrib-
uted proportionately among the owner-tenants. Thus it is apparent that
the corporation, serving as a convenient repository agency in this respect,
is merely the best available means of accomplishing desired objectives and
is not truly inconsistent with the prime object of tenant ownership.
In addition, the large initial outlay made by each member for his
stock has been properly termed the "capital investment" 1 of an amount
which is the ordinary equivalent of the market value of the apartment.
Use of that term is hardly to be explained unless the purchaser is to
gain "ownership" of an apartment thereby, particularly when it is re-
called that co-operative apartment corporations are essentially non-profit
in character so the stockholder cannot expect that any dividends would
be paid on his investment.
It has been urged that the proprietary lease is similar to an ordinary
lease, one which creates a relationship of landlord and tenant in no way
different from that created by any standard lease for a residential apart-
ment.11 The advocates for this position point out first that the monthly
9 In re Estate of Pitts, 218 Cal. 185 at 188, 22 P. (2d) 694 at 696 (1933).
10 See Tudor Arms Apartments v. Shaffer, 62 A. (2d) 346 (Md. Ct. of App., 1947).
11 Marks, "Coercive Aspects of Housing Cooperatives," 42 Ill. L. Ev. 728 (1948),
particularly p. 736. See also Braislin, Porter & Baldwin v. Sawdon, 68 N. Y. S. (2d)
774 (1946). But see contra: Curtis v. LeMay, 186 Misc. 853, 60 N. Y. S. (2d) 768
(1.945).
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assessments paid by each member are actually a form of "rent." In
the ordinary and legal sense of the word, "rent" signifies a profit or
reasonable return to the landlord for the use of property.1 2  Assessments
under a proprietary lease, however, are made for the sole purpose of
covering the operating expenses, maintenance, taxes, insurance, and pay-
ments on corporate indebtedness, 3 without thought of any general profit
to the corporation. It has also been urged, as an indication that the
holder of the proprietary lease is nothing more than a tenant, that cer-
tain house rules which govern his conduct and the cleanliness, safety,
and care of the apartment are appended to his lease with attendant pen-
alties for the violation thereof. Such rules simply round out the prin-
ciple of co-operation and cannot seriously be said to conflict with own-
ership. A large residential building is plainly not adaptable to the un-
restricted use of each apartment for, without some type of regulation,
few would care to live therein. To the same end are limitations against
structural change, against transfer of the tenant's interest and against
sub-letting; all of which usually require the securing of approval from
the board of directors or at least from a majority of the stockholders.
These provisions, while restrictive in a sense, really serve to increase the
value of the tenant's connection with the corporation by giving him a
voice in matters of vital interest, particularly when the failure of any
tenant to sustain his share of the common burden would increase the
burden of the others. The option given to the corporation to terminate
the tenancy upon default or for other violation of the lease is the only
logical and practical method for enforcing its terms.
Aside from the foregoing restraints, the co-operative participant is
accorded privileges which place the proprietary lease beyond the scope
of an ordinary lease. Some of these were pointed out in Hicks v. Bigelow,14
one of the few leading cases in this field. That opinion stated, in definite
terms, that the purchaser of a co-operative apartment is more than a
mere tenant or lessee for he enjoys certain proprietary rights which a
mere tenant lacks, rights which have most of the attributes of owner-
ship. These rights include a voice in the management and operation of
the building, in the selection or approval of other tenants, in the vital
matter of any proposed sale or mortgage of the property, but above all
in the exclusive, personal right to occupy a particular apartment. The
12 Black, Law Dict., 3d Ed., p. 1529.
13 The co-operative principle, treating the shareholder as the essential owner, is
recognized by 26 U. S. C. A. § 23(z), which permits the tenant to deduct his pro-
portionate share of the real estate taxes and interest on indebtedness, chargeable
to the corporation, from his personal income tax return.
14 55 A. (2d) 924 (Mun. Ct. of App., D. C., 1947).
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court might well have added that these rights normally extend over a
period of time far longer than that of the usual apartment lease, often
for the life of the corporation itself. Conversely, even in a long-term
lease of standard character, the lessor grants few covenants beyond the
one of quiet enjoyment whereas the corporation, under the proprietary
lease, in addition to the matters already mentioned, customarily cove-
nants to maintain a first class apartment building, to furnish services, to
execute all repairs with diligence, to keep books of account, to render
annual statements to the tenant, and to keep the building properly in-
sured. Finally, in the event of a sale of the property or of a termina-
tion of an individual lease, the corporate lessor is obliged to account to
the lessee for his proportionate share of the proceeds in the first instance,
or the full proceeds upon resale of his apartment in the second instance.15
Clearly, then, these features distinguish the proprietary lease from the
standard arrangement between the average landlord and tenant.
In surveying all these incidents, not only of the proprietary lease,
but of the co-operative organization as a whole, two thoughts suggest
themselves. First, those incidents which do restrict the tenant's rights
of ownership were placed there by the tenant owners themselves, who
control the government of the enterprise. Secondly, while there may be
seeming inconsistencies in the matter of tenant ownership, they are not
truly inconsistent when focused in the light of the overall plan, a plan
that is not perfectly adapted to its ends but is none the less a remark-
able combination of available legal devices. The conclusion to be drawn
from this analysis of the problem seems to be a fairly justifiable one that
a purchaser of stock and of a proprietary lease from a co-operative hous-
ing corporation should be treated as a landlord within the meaning of
the federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947, so as to be able to evict a
holdover tenant. The ruling in the instant case, then, appears to be in
line with what small weight of authority there is on the subject.
H. M. Ross, JR.
MASTER AND SERVANT-SERvICES AND COMPENSATION-WHETHER NON-
STRIKING UNION OFFICE WORKERS ARE ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT COM-
PENSATION BENEFITS WHEN AN AFFILIATED FACTORY WORKERS' UNION
CALLS A STRIKE IN THE SAME ESTABISHMIENT--In the recent Illinois
case of Outboard, Marine & Manufacturing Company v. Gordon,' the
15 The by-laws of the corporation may provide for the deduction of expenses in-
volved in reselling the apartment and of any indebtedness owed by the lessee to
the corporation. See McCullough, "Co-operative Apartments in Illinois," 26
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 303 (1948), particularly pp. 313-4.
1 403 Ill. 523, 87 N. E. (2d) 610 (1949).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
Supreme Court of Illinois, under a set of facts novel to this state, has
clarified the rights of employees to unemployment compensation when
they become unemployed because of a labor dispute. The claimants in that
case were members of an office workers' union which was an affiliate of a
union of factory workers in the same plant. The affiliation agreement
provided that the office union could not enter into contract negotiations
without the approval of the factory union and required the former union
to contribute one-fourth of its dues to the latter. Both groups of work-
ers entered into contract negotiations with the employer, the office em-
ployees being represented therein by officers of the factory union, and a
satisfactory agreement was reached as to the office workers. The em-
ployer failed to come to terms as to the factory employees and a strike
of the latter followed, resulting in a picket line through which only a
few maintenance men were permitted to pass. There was testimony that
the employer, desiring to avoid violence, kept the plant gates locked
thereby preventing the office workers from entering or attempting to
enter the premises had they so desired. Claims advanced by the office
workers for unemployment compensation benefits during the period of
the strike were denied by a deputy examiner on the theory that such
workers were participating in or at least were interested in the strike,
but the claims were granted on appeal to the Director. The allowance
of compensation was affirmed by both the circuit court and by the Illinois
Supreme Court.
Legislation calling for unemployment compensation originated in
England, but the first English statute provided that all employees whose
unemployment was the product of a labor dispute were to be disqualified
from receiving unemployment benefits. 2  The unfairness of this disquali-
fication, at least as it bore on those who had no interest in the dispute
and had not participated therein, became soon apparent and, four years
later, the English statute was amended.3 As amended, it permitted those
who became unemployed as a result of a labor dispute to draw unem-
ployment compensation benefits provided they neither participated in,
were directly interested in, nor financed the dispute and were not of the
same grade or class of workers as those who were directly concerned.
Following congressional enactment of the Social Security Act,4 all
of the American states, as well as the territories, adopted unemployment
compensation laws.' Nine states have enacted blanket disqualification
210-11 Geo. V, c. 30, § 8(1).
3 See 14-15 Geo. V, c. 30, § 4(1).
4 49 Stat. 635, 42 U. S. C. A. § 1102.
5 The state acts have followed, to a great extent, a bill drawn by the Social
Security Board.
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clauses similar to the original English statute6 but the remaining forty-
two states and territories imposed disqualification clauses substantially
similar to the amended English provision.7  Typical of the latter is the
Illinois enactment which, in substance, requires the claimant to show
absence of participation, of financing, of direct interest in the labor dis-
pute as well as membership in a different grade or class in order to be
eligible for benefits." As the claimants in the instant case admittedly were
unemployed because of a labor dispute,9 it became necessary for them to
show that they came within the noted exception to the disqualification
clause in order to receive payment of the benefit provided by law.
The issue of participation was decided on the basis that since the
claimants were prevented from obtaining entrance to the plant by virtue
of the locked gates, their failure to work did not constitute a participa-
tion in the strike.'0 This reasoning may be said to be in line with hold-
ings from the majority of jurisdictions which have passed on the ques-
tion. Whether the particular act could be said to be voluntary or in-
6 Ala. Code Ann. 1945, Tit. 26, § 214(A); Cal. Gen. Laws, Cum. Supp. 1945, Act
8780(d), §56A; Del. Laws 1937, Ch. 258, § 5(d) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. 1948, §341.360(1) ;
Minn. Stat. Ann. 1947, § 268.09(1) (6) ; New York, Labor Law, § 592(1) ; Ohio Gen.
Code Ann. 1948, § 1345-6d; Utah Code Ann., Cum. Supp. 1949, § 42-2a-5d; Wis. Stats.
1947, § 108.04(10).
7 Alaska, Comp. Laws Ann. 1949, § 51-5-4(d) ; Ariz. Code Ann. 1947, § 56-1005(d);
Ark. Dig. Stat., 1944 Cum. Supp., § 1089; Colo. Stat. Ann. 1947, Ch. 167A, § 5d;
Conn. Gen. Stat. 1949, § 7508(3); D. C. Code, Cum. Supp. 1948, Ch. 46, § 310(f) ;
Fla. Stats. 1945, § 443.06(4) ; Ga. Code Ann., 1947 Cure. Supp., § 54-610(d) ; Hawaii
Rev. Laws 1945, Ch. 74, § 4231(d) ; Ida. Code Ann. 1949, § 72-1366(j) ; Iowa Code
1946, § 96.5(4) ; Kans. Gen. Stat. Ann. 1947, § 44-706(d) ; La. Gen. Stat. Ann., Cum.
Supp. 1949, § 4434.4(d) ; Me. Rev. Stat. 1944, Ch. 24, § 5(d) ; Md. Ann. Code 1947,
Art. 95A, § 5(e) ; Mass. Ann. Laws 1942, Ch. 151A, § 25(b) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. 1947,
§ 17.531(b) ; Miss. Code Ann. 1943, § 7379(d); Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann., Cum. Supp.
1948, § 9431(11) (a); Mont. Rev. Code 1941, Tit. 87-106(d) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. 1947,
§ 48-628(d) ; Nev. Comp. Laws Ann. 1945, § 2825.05(d) ; N. H. Rev. Laws 1942, Ch.
218, § 4D; N. J. Stat. Ann. 1949, § 43:21-5(d) ; N. Mex. Stat. Ann. 1941, § 57-805(d) ;
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 1947, § 96-14(d) ; N. D. Rev. Code 1943, § 52-0602; Okla. Stat.
1949, Tit. 40, § 215(d) ; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. 1947, § 126-705(d) ; Pa. Stat. Ann.,
Cum. Supp. 1948, Tit. 43, § 802(d) ; R. I. Gen. Laws 1938, Ch. 284, § 7(4); S. C.
Code Ann. 1942, § 7035-82(d) ; S. D. Code 1939, § 17-0830(4); Tenn. Code Ann.,
Cum. Supp. 1948, § 6901.29E; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 1949, Art. 5221, sub. b-3(d) ;
Vt. Rev. Stat. 1947, § 5379-IV; Va. Code Ann. 1942, § 1887(97) (d); Wash. Rev.
Stat. Ann., 1945 supp., § 9998-215; W. Va. Code Ann. 1943, § 2366(78); Wyo. Comp.
Stat. Ann. 1945, § 54-105(B) (II).
s Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 223(d).
9 As to whether or not a labor dispute exists, see Am. Steel Foundries v. Gordon,
404 Ill. 174, 88 N. E. (2d) 465 (1949) ; Bankston Creek Collieries, Inc. v. Gordon,
399 Ill. 291, 77 N. R. (2d) 670 (1948) ; Fash v. Gordon, 398 Ill. 210, 75 N. E. (2d)
294 (1947); Adkins v. Indiana Employment Security Division, 117 Ind. App. 132,
70 N. E. (2d) 31 (1946) ; Westinghouse Electric Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Board
of Review, 165 Pa. Super. 385, 68 A. (2d) 393 (1949) ; In re Deep River Timber Co.,
8 Wash. (2d) 580, 110 P. (2d) 877 (1941). See also notes in 26 CHICAOO-KFNT LAW
REVIEW 180 and 36 Ill. B. J. 364.
10 Where blanket disqualification does not exist, proof of absence of participation
is necessary: see statutes cited in note 7, ante.
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voluntary has, in general, been made the criterion of determining whether
the employees participated in the dispute. An outright refusal to work
would obviously constitute participation. Similarly, a sympathy strike,
wherein one union refuses to work in order to support another striking
union, produces voluntary unemployment. 1 A failure to cross a picket
line established by the striking employees has been productive of much
dispute but has generally led to the result that a voluntary failure to
cross has been held to constitute participation in the dispute. 12  Where
"fear of physical violence" has been found present, however, the failure
to cross the picket line has been deemed to be involuntary in character
with the result that such employees have been classed as non-participants
in the strike.' 3 There must be more than a mere "theatrical threat" of
violence so the fear of "being photographed, '"" and the fear of "union
consequences'"" have been held insufficient to render the refusal to cross
involuntary.
The issue of participation because of affiliation has also arisen prior
to the present case but, unlike the holding therein, it has been held, on
slightly different circumstances, that the close relationship between the
two groups was sufficient to make the one a participant in the labor dis-
pute of the other. In the case of Burns v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review,'8 two local unions, whose members worked in the same
establishment, were affiliates of the same national union but only one of
the locals had called the strike. The members of the other local were
11 Aitken v. Board of Review of Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 136 N. J. L. 372,
56 A. (2d) 587 (1948) ; Drylie v. Unemployment Comp. Board of Review, 152 Pa.
Super. 211, 56 A. (2d) 272 (1948); Barnas v. Unemployment Comp. Board of
Review, 152 Pa. Super. 429, 33 A. (2d) 258 (1943).
12 The result in California may be attributable to the blanket disqualification
adopted by the state: McKinley v. Calif. Employment Stabilization Comm'n, - Cal.
(2d) -, 209 P. (2d) 602 (1949) ; Bunny's Waffle Shop v. Same, 24 Cal. (2d) 735,
151 P. (2d) 224 (1944) ; Matson Terminals, Inc. v. Same, 24 Cal. (2d) 695, 151 P.
(2d) 202 (1944); Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. Same, 17 Cal. (2d) 321, 109 P. (2d) 595
(1941). No such blanket disqualification is involved in Baldassarius v. Egan, 135
Conn. 695, 68 A. (2d) 120 (1949) ; Brown v. Maryland Unemp. Comp. Bd., 189 Md.
250, 55 A. (2d) 696 (1947) ; Meyer v. Indus. Comm'n of Mo. - Mo. -, 223 S. W.
(2d) 835 (1949); McGann v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review, 163 Pa. Super. 379,
62 A. (2d) 90 (1948); Phillips v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review, 163 Pa. Super. 374,
62 A. (2d) 84 (1948); Appeal of Employees of Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 31 Wash. (2d)
659, 198 P. (2d) 675 (1948) ; Andreas v. Bates, 14 Wash. (2d) 322, 128 P. (2d) 300
(1942) ; In re Deep River Timber Co., 8 Wash. (2d) 179, 111 P. (2d) 575 (1941) ;
In re St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 7 Wash. (2d) 580, 110 P. (2d) 877 (1941).
Only one case has reached a contrary result: State v. Ruth Coal Co., - W. Va. -,
56 S. E. (2d) 549 (1949).
13 Steamship Trade Assoc. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Davis, - Md. -, 57 A. (2d) 818
(1948).
14 Appeal of Employees of Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 31 Wash. (2d) 659, 198 P. (2d)
675 (1948).
15 Stillman Unempl. Comp. Case, 161 Pa. Super. 569, 56 A. (2d) 380 (1948).
16 164 Pa. Super. 470, 65 A. (2d) 445 (1949).
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denied benefits on the basis of the reasoning that the suspension was
voluntary in that (1) the national union had approved the strike, and (2)
there was some basis for inferring that the action of the national was
assented to by the non-striking local. Such reasoning would appear to
be an extension of the sphere of voluntary action beyond its natural
orbit, so it is not surprising that it was not followed by the Illinois
court in the instant case. Absence of participation, however, would not
be enough to escape disqualification for other requirements must also
be met.
When faced with the problem of determining whether the office
workers' union in the instant case was disqualified because it had financed
the factory union, the Illinois court declared that the fact that a por-
tion of the dues collected had reached the treasury of the factory union
was, in itself, insufficient to constitute financing. The office union re-
ceived supplies and stationery in return for the small amount of money
so paid and no additional or special assistance was rendered to the
striking union. Again, most jurisdictions which have passed upon the
question have reached the conclusion that the payment of dues alone does
not amount to a financing of the labor dispute. Three state legislatures
have specifically so provided,17 and at least one court has required other
active financial aid in addition to the payment of dues before disquali-
fication may be found present.18 The membership of a local in a na-
tional organization has, however, been held sufficient in and of itself
to constitute a financing of any striking local within the national or-
ganization on the theory that the non-striking local may be said to have
a proprietary interest in the dues which it has contributed to the na-
tional, particularly if those funds have been used to aid the striking
local.19 Reasoning of that type is not generally followed, was not dis-
cussed by the Illinois Supreme Court in the instant case, and would
appear to be contrary to the present trend on the point. The presence
of a combination of statutes providing that the payment of dues is not
to be considered financing, together with ten other statutes which have
eliminated the necessity of proving an absence of financing to support




17Fla. Stat. 1945, § 443.06(4); Mass. Ann. Laws 1942, Ch. 151A, § 25(b); Mich.
Stat. Ann. 1947, § 17.531(b).
is Aitken v. Bd. of Review of Unemp. Comp. Comm'n, 136 N. J. L. 372, 56 A. (2d)
587 (1948).
19 See Copen v.Hix, 130 W. Va. 343, 43 S. E. (2d) 382 (1947).
20 See the statutes of Alaska, Dist. of Columbia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. References thereto are
set forth in note 7, ante.
21 See note in 49 Col. L. Rev. 550.
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In passing upon the issue of direct interest,22 the Illinois court de-
cided that the members of the office union were not directly interested
in the dispute as no wage increase or other benefit could accrue to them,
regardless of the result of the dispute between the factory workers and
the company, for their contract had already been negotiated. That con-
clusion is also in conformity with the view followed in a majority of
the other jurisdictions for they require that the working conditions of
the employee must be subject to an adverse or favorable outcome before
he can be said to be directly interested in the dispute.2  Thus it has been
held that interest is present where the employee's wages,
24 his hours,25
the steward or the seniority system 28 will be affected by the result of the
strike, even though the employee may be personally opposed to the strike
and may have voted against it.27 Following this reasoning, at least two
jurisdictions have held that where a single union is the bargaining agency
which represents all employees, all are disqualified if the union calls
a strike despite the fact that the claimants themselves are not union
members.28  An implied assent to the strike on behalf of the non-union
minority has been found present on the theory that, as the union is the
22 Each of the forty-two states and territories which provide any exception to the
principle of disqualification require proof of the absence of direct interest: note 7,
ante.
23 Huiet v. Boyd, 64 Ga. App. 564, 13 S. E. (2d) 863 (1941) ; Auker v. Review
Board, 117 Ind. App. 486, 71 N. E. (2d) 629 (1947); Kemiel v. Review Board, 117
Ind. App. 357, 72 N. E. (2d) 238 (1947); Chrysler Corp. v. Appeal Bd. of Mich.
Unemp. Comp. Comm'n, 301 Mich. 351, 3 N. W. (2d) 302 (1942) ; Chrysler Corp. v.
Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 298 N. W. 87 (1941) ; Unemp. Comp. Comm'n v. Lunceford,
229 N. C. 570, 50 S. E. (2d) 497 (1948).
24 Huiet v. Boyd, 64 Ga. App. 564, 13 S. E. (2d) 863 (1941).
25 Chrysler Corp. v. Appeal Bd. of Mich. Unemp. Comp. Comm'n, 301 Mich. 351,
3 N. W. (2d) 302 (1942); Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 298 N. W. 87
(1941).
26 Nobes v. Unemp. Comp. Comm'n, 313 Mich. 472, 21 N. W. (2d) 820 (1946).
27 The recent case of Local No. 658 v. Brown Shoe Co., 403 IlL. 484, 87 N. E. (2d)
625 (1949), seems to have adopted this line of reasoning. Eighteen key workers
there went on a "wildcat" strike against the wishes of their union which had been
made the certified bargaining agent for all of the employees. Eventually, all
workers were laid off when the entire plant had to be closed down because of the
resulting bottleneck. All employees, except the striking eighteen, filed claims for
unemployment compensation but were denied benefits. The court held that as the
employer was subjected to economic pressure from the entire group, without being
able to negotiate with the few who were dissatisfied and who constituted an
essential link in the whole operation, all were ineligible even though they may
personally have opposed the strike. The logic dictating such a decision is obvious.
If the result were otherwise, it would be possible for a union to pull out a key
group of employees and tie up the plant yet have the remaining employees draw
unemployment compensation and relieve the union of the considerable financial
strain of a strike. The enhancement thus afforded to its bargaining position would
be obvious.
28 Auker v. Review Board, 117 Ind. App. 486, 71 N. E. (2d) 629 (1947) ; Kemiel
v. Review Board, 117 Ind. App. 357, 72 N. E. (2d) 238 (1947) ; Appeals of Em-
ployees of Polson Lumber Co., 19 Wash. (2d) 467, 143 P. (2d) 316 (1943).
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sole bargaining agency for all employees, all will benefit if the strike
should be successful. Narrow interpretation of the phrase "directly in-
terested" has been given in three jurisdictions which would limit dis-
qualification only to those "creating the dispute or participating therein
in order to enforce their demands. ' '25 So narrow an interpretation is
obviously open to criticism on the ground of a confusion between the
phrase "directly interested" on the one hand and the phrase "partici-
pating in" on the other. They are not synonymous and the legislature, by
enacting two different requirements for exemption, obviously intended
they should be different and mutually exclusive.
On the last point, the Illinois Supreme Court decided that the of-
fice workers were of a different grade or class than the factory workers
not only because of the difference in their duties but also because of the
fact that each group had a separate union contract with the employer.
The phrase "grade or class" has been made the subject of widely con-
flicting interpretations °. 3  At one extreme, may be found cases which
have held that all workers in the plant are of the same group or class,
either because one bargaining agency represented all"' or because all were
engaged in a "continuous integrated process, as semi-skilled workers
with similar wages. '"32 Other cases divide workers into "cohesive groups
acting in concert," thereby serving to place all non-union workers into
one group and union workers in a different class. 33  Perhaps the most
logical division is one which distinguishes production workers from main-
tenance workers or permits of separation by departments.34 Under this
view, the type of work done becomes the determining factor,3 5 so the
separation of office workers from factory workers affords a sound founda-
tion for the Illinois holding.
While it may be said that the case under discussion presents nothing
29 Dept. of Indus. Relations v. Drummond, 30 Ala. App. 78, 1 So. (2d) 395 (1941) ;
Kieckhefer Container Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 125 N. J. L. 155, 13 A.
(2d) 648 (1940) ; Wickland v. Commissioners, 18 Wash. (2d) 206, 138 P. (2d) 876
(1943).
30 Only three states possessing an exceptions clause do not require the petitioning
workers to prove that they are not of the same grade or class as those who have
participated in the labor dispute. They are Louisiana, Rhode Island and Vermont.
31 Members of Iron Workers Union of Provo v. Indus. Comm'n, 104 Utah 242,
139 P. (2d) 208 (1943).
32 Johnson v. Pratt, 200 S. C. 315, 20 S. E. (2d) 865 (1942).
33 Queener v. Magnet Mills, Inc., 179 Tenn. 416, 167 S. W. (2d) 1 (1946); Copen
v. Hix, 130 W. Va. 343, 43 S. E. (2d) 382 (1947).
34 See Nordling v. Ford Motors Co., - Minn. -, 42 N. W. (2d) 576 (1950), as to
what constitutes a "department" of the employer for this purpose.
35 Kieckhefer Container Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 125 N. J. L. 155,
13 A. (2d) 648 (1940) ; Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Marlen, 228 N. C. 277,
45 S. E. (2d) 385 (1947).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
of novel significance when it is evaluated in the light of decisions from
other jurisdictions, and has not resulted in any new or different inter-
pretation of a commonly found statute, yet the decision possesses note-
worthy interest because of the way in which it does pin-point the fea-
tures which should control the right to unemployment compensation
benefits.
K. J. DOUGLAS
OBSCENITY - OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS, PICTURES, AND ARTICLES -
WHETHER OR NOT A PHONOGRAPH RECORD, CONTAINING OBSCENE, LEWD,
AND LASCIVIOUS WORDS, SONGS, OR OTHER MATTER IS AN ARTICLE OR IN-
STRUMENT OF INDECENT OR IMMORAL USE OR PURPOSE WITHIN THE PRO-
HIBITION OF OBSCENITY STATUTEs-In People v. Strassner,1 the Court of
Appeals of New York was called upon to deal with a problem of statutory
construction which, as yet, has been undetermined' by the highest court
of any other state having analogous statutory provisions. The problem
presented was whether or not a phonograph record came within a statu-
tory prohibition against the sale or possession of obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy or indecent matter. The defendant was convicted on an informa-
tion which charged a violation of a state statute2 in that he possessed a
filthy, indecent and disgusting phonograph record. His conviction was
reversed by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the specific enumera-
tion of obscene articles in the first clause of the statute,3 articles whose
obscenity could be communicated by visual representation, as well as any
general phraseology therein,4 was inadequate to condemn the instrumen-
tality which formed the basis of defendant's prosecution since his ma-
terial called for auditory representation accomplished by mechanical
means.
The case under discussion accurately points up a problem dealing
with the interpretation to be given to various state statutes relating to
obscenity, which interpretation may determine whether or not said stat-
utes are sufficient to embody phonograph records as articles or instruments
of indecent or immoral use or purpose, so as to punish the possession
thereof. The magnitude of the problem is made the more evident by the
fact that only two states have, by express provision, made the trafficking
1 299 N. Y. 325, 87 N. E. (2d) 280 (1949).
2 McKinney, Consol. Laws Ann., Vol. 39, Part 1, Art. 106, § 1141.
3 See note 2, ante. Specific reference is there made to "any obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, indecent, or disgusting book, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper,
story paper, writing, paper, picture, drawing, photograph, figure or image."
4 The statute concluded with the words "... or any written or printed matter of
an indecent character."
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in obscene phonograph records specifically punishable.5  A number of
other statutes, by confining their language to specific enumerations of
species,6 none of which can be said to include phonograph records, will
obviously require legislative amendment before the ills of obscene phono-
graph records can be adequately coped with. The balance, because they
contain general phrases of ambiguous terminology, will require judicial
interpretation as a preface to any determination of whether or not they
possess the means of inhibiting the exploitation of smut accomplished by
the production and sale of obscene phonograph records. A reading thereof
discloses certain common similarities which will admit them to categorical
analysis. For the purpose of this study, such method will be employed.
First, a majority of these states possess statutes which, after spe-
cifically enumerating certain species of obscene articles, follow such spe-
cific enumeration with a general phrase.' Although the wording of the
general phrases found in this group of statutes does differ, they do possess
similarity in that each is introduced by words such as "or any," "or
other," or "or any other," and then follows some generic term which
might be claimed to be sufficiently broad to include a phonograph record
within its definition. No fair and reasonable meaning given to the items
in the specifically enumerated species could include a phonograph record
therein. If such records are to be classified as punishable obscenity there-
under it must be because such objects are found to lie within the generic
terms contained in the general clauses. The issue, then, becomes one as
to just how far a court may go, when subjecting these general phrases
to interpretation.
5 Deering Cal. Penal Code 1949, Tit. 9, Ch. 8, § 311; Mass. Ann. Laws 1933, Vol. 9,
Ch. 272, § 28, as amended.
6 Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 14, Ch. 64, §§ 372-4; Ariz. Code Ann. 1939, Ch. 43, § 3002;
Ark. Stat. Ann. 1947, Tit. 41, § 2704; Ga. Code 1933, Ch. 26, § 6301, as amended by
Laws 1941, p. 358; Hawaii Rev. Laws 1945, Tit. 30, Ch. 242, § 11107; Ida. Code 1947,
Vol. 4, Tit. 18, § 4101; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1939, Vol. 13, Oh. 31, Art. 8, § 4660;
Mont. Rev. Code 1947, Vol. 8, Tit. 94, Ch. 36, § 94-3603; N. H. Rev. Laws 1942,
Vol. 2, Ch. 441, § 14; N. Mex. Stats. Ann. 1941, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, § 1812; Okla. Stats.
Ann. 1936, Tit. 21, Ch. 36, § 1021; S. D. Code 1939, Vol. 1, Tit. 13, Ch. 13.17,
§ 13.1722; Williams' Tenn. Code Ann. 1934, Vol. 7, Tit. 1, Ch. 9, § 11190; Vernon's
Tex. Penal Code Ann. 1925, Vol. 1, Tit. 10, Ch. 7, Arts. 526-7, as amended; Utah
Code Ann. 1943, Vol. 1, Tit. 15, Ch. 8, § 41.
7 Fla. Stats. 1941, Tit. 44, Ch. 847, § 847.01; Iowa Code 1946, Vol. 2, Ch. 725,
§ 725.5; Dart's La. Crim. Law and Pro. Code 1943, Ch. 3, § 740-106; Me. Rev. Stat.
1944, Vol. 2, Ch. 121, § 24; Md. Ann. Code 1939, Vol. 1, Art. 27, § 495; Mich. Stats.
Ann. 1936, Vol. 25, Ch. 286(a), § 28.575; Minn. Stats. Ann. 1945, Vol. 40, Ch. 617,
§ 617.24(i) ; Miss. Code Ann. 1942, Vol. 2, Ch. 1, § 2288; Neb. Rev. Stats. 1943, Vol. 2,
Ch. 28, Art. 9, § 28-921; Nev. Comp. Laws 1929, Vol. 5, Ch. 14, § 10144; N. J. Stats.
Ann. (Perm. Ed.) 1937, Tit. 2, Ch. 140, § 2; N. C. Gen. Stats. 1943, Vol. 1, Ch. 14,
§ 14-189; Ore. Comp. Laws 1940, Vol. 3, Tit. 23, Ch. 9, § 23-924; R. I. Gen. Laws
1938, Ch. 610, § 13; S. C. Code 1942, Vol. 1, Ch. 73, § 1443; Vt. Stats. 1947, Ch. 70,
Tit. 41, § 8490; Va. Code 1942, Ch. 183, § 2459; W. Va. Code Ann. 1943, Ch. 61,
§ 6066; Wis. Stats. 1947, Vol. 2, Tit. 32, Ch. 351, § 351.38.
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
The production of obscene phonograph records being a matter of rather
recent innovation in the field of lewd practices, it is not surprising that
there exists a minimum of judicial decisions dealing with the point. Two
cases do serve to underscore the basic problem. In the reported case,
the New York Court of Appeals, faced with interpreting the general phrase
"or any written or printed matter," was not content to rest its deci-
sion solely upon the obvious ground that the adjectives "printed" and
"written," by themselves, operated to exclude from the general phrase
an instrumentality which could hardly be contended to be either a "writ-
ing" or a "printing" as those terms are currently understood. In-
stead, the court also pointed out that the several items in the specifically
enumerated species all served to address their obscenity to the mind
through the sense of sight. It is this latter observation which indicates
the feature which is common to all the varied items specifically enumer-
ated in the statutes here under consideration. This common character-
istic should be kept in mind, as attention shifts from one category of
statutes to another, in order that the resultant effect thereof upon the
general phrases therein contained may be best appreciated.
Citing as authority for the position taken by them, the New York
Court of Appeals referred to the holding in Alpers v. United States.'
That case concerned an appeal taken from a conviction on two counts
of an information charging the appellant with knowingly depositing with
a carrier, for transportation in interstate commerce, certain lewd and
indecent phonograph records. It was the theory of the government's
case that such acts constituted a violation of a federal code provision
on the subject.9 Judge Orr, writing an opinion which reversed the con-
viction, there stated that, as penal statutes must be strictly construed, the
rule ejusdem generis became particularly applicable when the phrase
presented was a general one which followed a specifically enumerated class
of persons or things. He was of the opinion that a search of the legis-
lative history of the code provision justified the restriction of the gen-
eral phrase "or other matter of an indecent character," as found therein,
to species of articles like those enumerated and whose obscenity is com-
municated to the mind by the sense of sight. This decision serves to supply
another observation which will be particularly pertinent to those con-
cerned with the problem of interpretation and that is the rule ejusdem
generis may prove helpful.
That rule, although variously defined, is generally accepted to be
that where, in a statute, general words follow a particular designation of
8175 F. (2d) 137 (1949).
9 18 U. S. C. A. § 396. The section is now numbered § 1462.
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persons or things, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be
presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the particular designation
and as including only persons or things of the same kind, class, character
or nature as those specifically designated. 10 It is said to be based upon
the obvious reason that if the legislature had intended the general words
to be used in an unrestricted sense, no mention would have been made of
the particular classes.1 Under that rule, as applied to statutes falling in
the first class, obscene phonograph records could not be found to lie
within the general phrases because not within the genus whose enumerated
species have the common characteristic of communicating their obscenity
by the sense of sight alone.
At this point, it is significant to note that the decision in the case of
Alpers v. Umnited States, 2 cited as authoritative basis for the decision in
the instant case, was later reversed by the Supreme Court of the United
States 3 in an opinion rendered subsequent to that filed in the New York
case. The majority of that court arrived at a different conclusion both as
to the application of the rule ejusdem generis and also as to the legisla-
tive intention which might be gathered from the context of the act. Justice
Minton, writing the majority decision which reinstated the conviction of
the defendant, declared that the obvious purpose of the legislation under
consideration was "to prevent the channels of interstate commerce from
being used to disseminate any matter that, in its essential nature, com-
municates obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy ideas." He noted that Con-
gress had legislated "with respect to a number of evils in addition to those
10 The widespread acceptance of that definition may be noted in such holdings as
Goode v. Tylor, 237 Ala. 106, 186 So. 129 (1939); Bell v. Vaughn, 46 Ariz. 515,
53 P. (2d) 61 (1936) ; People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. (2d) 880, 156 P. (2d) 7 (1945);
Martinez v. People, 111 Colo. 52, 137 P. (2d) 690 (1943) ; State v. Certain Contra-
ceptive Materials, 126 Conn. 428, 11 A. (2d) 863 (1940); Dunham v. State, 140
Fla. 754, 192 So. 324 (1940); Beavers v. LeSeuer, 188 Ga. 393, 3 S. E. (2d) 667
(1939) ; State v. Gardner, 174 Iowa 748, 156 N. W. 747 (1916) ; Bullman v. City of
Chicago, 367 Ill. 217, 10 N. E. (2d) 961 (1937); Dowd v. Sullivan, 217 Ind. 196,
27 N. E. (2d) 82 (1940) ; State v. Miller, 90 Kans. 230, 133 P. 878 (1913) ; Federal
Chemical Co. v. Paddock, 244 Ky. 338, 94 S. W. (2d) 645 (1936) ; State v. Texas
Co., 205 La. 217, 17 So. (2d) 569 (1944) ; American Ice Co. v. Fitshugh, 128 Md.
382, 97 A. 999 (1916) ; People v. Powell, 280 Mich. 699, 274 N. W. 372 (1937);
School Dist. No. 30 v. Consol. School Dist. No. 30, 151 Minn. 52, 185 N. W. 961
(1921) ; State v. Russell, 185 Miss. 13, 187 So. 540 (1939) ; Zinn v. City of Steel-
ville, 351 Mo. 413, 173 S. W. (2d) 398 (1943); Mancuso v. State, 123 Neb. 204,
242 N. W. 430 (1932) ; State v. Craig, 176 N. C. 740, 97 S. E. 400 (1918) ; Ganstad
v. Nygaard, Sheriff, 64 N. D. 785, 256 N. W. 230 (1934) ; In re Frietag's Estate,
165 Ore. 427, 107 P. (2d) 978 (1941) ; In re Fredirick's Estate, 333 Pa. 327, 5 A.
(2d) 91 (1939) ; State v. Hollock, 114 Vt. 292, 44 A. (2d) 326 (1945) ; State v.
Eberhart, 106 Wash. 222, 179 P. 853 (1919). These cases do not necessarily deal
with the subject of obscenity.
11 See State v. Campbell, 76 Iowa 122, 40 N. W. 100 (1888).
12175 F. (2d) 137 (1949).
1'5- U. S. -, 70 S. Ct. 352, 94 L. Ed. (adv.) 353 (1950).
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prescribed by the portion of the statute under which respondent was
charged." As statutes were to be construed with their entire context in
mind, he believed that a comprehensive statute should not be "constricted
by a mechanical rule of construction."14
What then is the conclusion to be drawn from the reviewed decisions ?
It is believed by this writer that the general phrases in the first category
of statutes will be subjected to interpretation pursuant to the rule of
ejusdem generis, and the general words "or any," "or other," or "or any
other," will be read as if stated in the form of "other such like." ' 15 The
reasons for this conclusion are several. First, the rule has been univer-
sally employed in ascertaining legislative intention where general words
follow the specific enumeration of classes of persons or things. Second,
almost all of the states here concerned recognize and admit the existence
of the rule, either applying or denying it application as the facts of each
case dictate.' 6 Third, the rule is the most consistent one which might be
applied when the statute is one requiring strict construction.17 Finally,
the United States Supreme Court decision in the Alpers case, although
stating a limitation often expressed to exist,' 8 is distinguishable from the
situation presented by statutes in this first category for the federal code
provision, unlike the state provisions, enumerate articles whose obscenity
is not confined to communication or transmission by the sense of sight.
As it enumerates other articles whose obscenity comes into existence only
when employed for a particular use or purpose, not being obscene per se
merely by presentation to one's sight, the problems are not identical. The
conclusion, therefore, most consistent with well established principles of
statutory construction when bearing in mind the strict interpretation
usually given to penal statutes, is that phonograph records of the type in
14- U. S. - at -, 70 S. Ct. 352 at 354, 94 L. Ed. (adv.) 353 at 355.
15 Hodgson v. Mountain & Gulf Oil Co., 297 F. 269 (1924); State v. Campbell,
76 Iowa 122, 40 N. W. 100 (1888) ; Commonwealth v. Dejardin, 126 Mass. 46, 30 Am.
Rep. 652 (1878) ; Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn. 200, 77 N. W. 31 (1898).
16 See cases cited in note 10, ante.
17 First National Bank v. United States, 206 F. 374 (1913) ; People v. Thomas,
25 Cal. (2d) 880, 156 P. (2d) 7 (1945) ; Martinez v. People, 111 Colo. 52, 137 P.
(2d) 690 (1943) ; Ex parte Muckenfuss, 52 Tex. Cr. 467, 107 S. W. 1131 (1908);
State v. Goodrich, 84 Wis. 359, 54 N. W. 577 (1893).
18 Helvering v. Stockholme Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 55 S. Ct. 50, 79 L. Ed.
211 (1934) ; Martin v. State, 156 Ala. 89, 47 So. 104 (1908) ; State v. Gallagher,
101 Ark. 593, 143 S. W. 98 (1912) ; Gibson v. People, 44 Colo. 600, 99 P. 333 (1900) ;
City of Chicago v. N. & M. Hotel Co., 248 Ill. 264, 93 N. E. 753 (1910) ; State v.
Miller, 90 Kan. 230, 133 P. 878 (1913) ; Brown v. Corbin, 40 Minn. 508, 42 N. W. 481
(1889) ; State v. Smith, 233 Mo. 242, 135 S. W. 465 (1911) ; Burk v. Montana Power
Co., 79 Mont. 52, 255 P. 337 (1927) ; Dillard v. State, 104 Neb. 209, 175 N. W. 668
(1920); People v. Kaye, 212 N. Y. 407, 106 N. E. 122 (1914); Klingensmith v.
Siegal, 57 N. D. 768, 224 N. W. 680 (1929) ; Vassey v. Spake, 83 S. C. 566, 65 S. E.
825 (1909) ; State v. Bridges, 19 Wash. 431, 53 P. 545 (1898).
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question are to be excluded from things regarded as punishable obscenity,
at least until statutory modification occurs.
Passing now to a consideration of those statutes which fall within the
second category,19 it will be noticed that these statutes similarly contain
a specific enumeration of obscene articles which address their obscenity to
the mind through the sense of sight but, following this specific enumera-
tion, are two general phrases. The first is similar to that involved in the
reported New York case. It is followed by another which describes "or
any article or instrument of indecent or immoral use or purpose." Too
close identity between the last mentioned phrase and that frequently
appearing in the first category of statutes might erroneously lead a court
to apply the decision of the New York case. If this second phrase were
missing, statutes in this category would be directly analogous to the one
treated there and it would be proper to assume that the general phrase
"or other engraved, printed, or written matter" would exhaust all other
species not specifically enumerated and falling within the genus of en-
graved, printed, or written matter.
But, with the exhaustion of that genus, i.e. things appealing to sight,
the second phrase, found in this group of statutes, would be rendered
useless if it were afforded the same interpretation. To obviate this unde-
sirable result, it is believed the courts would clothe the second phrase
with a general meaning different from that attaching to the specifically
enumerated articles. In Mason v. United States,2 ° the court stated that
the rule of ejusdem generis would not be employed to "render general
words meaningless, since that would be to disregard the primary rule
that effect should be given to every part of a statute, if legitimately pos-
sible, and that the words of a statute or other document are to be taken
according to their natural meaning." '21 If then, the specific words are
sufficiently comprehensive to exhaust the genus and leave nothing essen-
tially similar upon which the general words may operate, there would be
no room for application of the doctrine.
22
19 See Colo. Stats. Ann. 1935, Vol. 2, Ch. 48, § 217; Conn. Gen. Stats, 1949, Vol. 3,
Ch. 423, § 8567; Dela. Laws 1941, Ch. 239, p. 1018, amending Rev. Code 1935, Ch.
153, § 32; Kans. Gen. Stats. 1935, Ch. 21, § 2110; Purdon's Pa. Stats. Ann. 1939,
Tit. 18, Ch. 2, § 4524.
20 260 U. S. 545, 43 S. Ct. 200, 67 L. Ed. 396 (1923).
21260 U. S. 545 at 554, 43 S. Ct. 200 at 202, 67 L. Ed. 396 at 399.
22 See also United States v. Mescall, 215 U. S. 26, 30 S. Ct. 19, 54 L. Ed. 77
(1909) ; Arizona Sulphur Mining Co. v. Anderson, 33 Ariz. 64, 262 P. 489 (1927) ;
Schleman v. Guaranty Title Co., 153 Fla. 379, 15 So. (2d) 754 (1944); Phelps v.
Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 318, 272 S. W. 743 (1925); Utica State Say. Bank v.
Village of Oak Park, 279 Mich. 568, 273 N. W. 271 (1937) ; Stall v. Frank Electric
Co., 289 Mo. 25, 240 S. W. 245 (1922) ; Gates v. Chandler, 174 Miss. 815, 165 So. 442
(1936) ; State v. Wells, 146 Oh4o St. 131, 64 N. E. (2d) 593 (1946) ; Kansas City
Southern Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 38 Okla. 233, 132 P. 908 (1913) ; Knoxtenn Theatres
v. McConless, 177 Tenn. 497, 151 S. W. (2d) 164 (1941) ; State v. Savidge, 144
Wash. 302, 258 P. 1 (1927).
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Does it follow, however, that under statutes in this category obscene
phonograph records can be said to lie within the broad generic terms of
"article" or "instrument." The New York court, in the instant case,
disposing of a contention by the state that the information had been drawn
under a second clause in the New York statute identical to the phrase
hereunder consideration, indicated that a phonograph record could be-
come an "article of indecent or immoral use" when it served to reproduce
an indecent song or conversation. It did, however, properly refuse to rule
on the point after it reached the conclusion that the information had not
been framed under this clause of the statute. The dictum displays a
judicial attitude favorable toward the inclusion of phonograph records
within the term "article," and there is a magistrate 's decision in New
York which does so hold. 23 A similar holding would seem proper under
the sectional provision of the Kentucky statute,24 where reference is spe-
cifically made to articles and instruments of indecent or immoral use or
purpose, as well as to such generic terms as "article" and "instrument."
In the final category of statutes, 25 while there is a specific enumeration
given to articles falling within the genus of obscene articles which serve
to communicate their obscenity to the mind by the sense of sight, refer-
ence is also made to an "instrument or article of immoral use or pur-
pose," but the connecting phrase such as "any," "or any," or "or any
other" is conspicuous by its absence. As the presence of such linking
terms appears to be a condition precedent to the operation of the rule
ejusdern generis, it may be argued that the general phrase so found therein
could be construed to include articles whose obscenity exists more in their
use than in the presentation of the offensive matter to one's sight. It is
believed that the absence of the general words reflects an intention on the
part of the legislature to make this phrase refer to one of an enumerated
class of obscene articles but to leave its meaning unencumbered, that is to
possess a general meaning not to be drawn into assimilation with the other
specifically enumerated species. Only the Illinois statute, one of this
class, appears to have been subjected to an interpretative decision. In
Lanteen Laboratories, Inc. v. Clark,26 the Illinois Appellate Court of its
own motion took notice that the contract submitted to it for specific per-
formance was tainted with illegality in that it called for the indiscrim-
inate sale of contraceptives through drug stores, thereby involving the
23 People ex rel. Kahan v. Jaffe, 178 Misc. 523, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 104 (1942).
24 Ky. Rev. Stat. 1948, Ch. 436, § 436.090.
25 D. C. Code 1940, Tit. 22, § 2001; Ili. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 468;
Burns' Ind. Stats. Ann. 1933, Vol. 4, Ch. 28, § 10-2803; Wyo. Comp. Stats. Ann.
1945, Vol. 1, Ch. 9, § 9-513.
26 294 Ill. App. 81, 13 N. E. (2d) 678 (1938).
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sale of an "article of indecent or immoral use." It can hardly be con-
tended that contraceptives are articles wherein the obscenity is communi-
cated to the mind merely by the presentation of the article to sight.
Rather, it is the use thereof which becomes offensive to public morality.
While interpretation of statutes in this category remains a matter of
question because of lack of sufficient judicial construction on which to
base an adequate opinion, it is believed that such interpretation should
include articles which are not of the same kind as those specifically
enumerated. Decisions of that character would attribute sense and mean-
ing to the added language. While judicial legislation should always be
guarded against, judicial throttling of legislative intention is equally
undesirable.
It would appear, then, that many states, because of narrow statutory
language, are ill-equipped to punish persons who mock at public morality
by the production and sale of obscene phonograph records. Others, by
sufficiently comprehensive statutory terminology, at least when aided by
proper judicial interpretation, have made it possible to punish those who
would produce and traffic in illicit instrumentalities of the type here
considered. Against the possibility of doubt arising in such cases, close




ATTORNEY AND CLIENT--THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY-WHETHER OR NOT
ACTIVITiEs ENGAGED IN BY PERSONS NOT ADMiITTED NOR LICENSED CONSTI-
TUTE THE PRACTICE OF LAW-Although no exact definition of what con-
stitutes the practice of law has ever been spelled out by the Supreme Court
of Illinois, or by any other high court for that matter, the two recent deci-
sions in Peoples v. Schafer1 and in Chicago Bar Association v. Kellogg2 tend
to throw more light on the subject. In the first, a licensed real estate
broker was charged with contempt on an information before the Supreme
Court' for having practiced law without a license in that he had custom-
arily engaged in the preparation of deeds, contracts and mortgages in
real estate transactions in which he was the procuring agent and also
advised a customer, for a fee, on matters concerning the disposition of
her estate. The court conceded that the mere act of filling out blanks in
prepared forms might not amount to practicing law but that, as legal
practice involves more than appearance in court in connection with liti-
gation, 4 a person who elicits information and advises thereon in conjunction
with the process of completing such forms could well be guilty of con-
tempt for performing the functions of an attorney at law.
In the second, a licensed practitioner before the United States Patent
Office was named as defendant in a suit to enjoin him from engaging in
the general practice of law5 albeit such practice was related to patent
matters. It appeared that he had rendered legal opinions relating to the
infringement and enforcement of patents and trademarks, had prepared
and filed pleadings and other legal documents, had construed contracts,
had prepared and served notice of and had asserted an attorney's lien
under an appropriate statute relating to attorneys,' and in general had
engaged in quite diversified business transactions of the type customarily
handled by general attorneys. On appeal from a decree granting an
injunction, transferred to the Appellate Court because no constitutional
1404 Ill. 45, 87 N. E. (2d) 773 (1949).
2 338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N. E. (2d) 519 (1949).
3 Original jurisdiction to punish one for practicing law without a license exists
in the Supreme Court which has inherent power to regulate the practice of law:
People v. Peoples' Stock Yards Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901 (1931).
4 People v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N. E. (2d) 693 (1948).
5 For the right to seek an injunction rather than to punish for contempt, see
Smith v. Illinois Adjustment Finance Co., 326 Ill. App. 654, 63 N. E. (2d) 264
(1945).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, § 14.
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question was involved, 7 that court enlarged the decree on all points, ex-
cept as to advising and assisting applicants for patents in the presenta-
tion and prosecution of their applications before the Patent Office, on the
ground the acts enumerated constituted a type of legal practice forbidden
to all except duly admitted attorneys at law.
While a precise definition of what constitutes the practice of law may
be lacking because of the practical impossibility of making one definition
sufficiently broad to encompass the entire field, the details of that definition
begin to take shape through the medium of a series of cases in which
isolated acts have been held to amount to the practice of law. To those
cases already decided,8 must now be added the two here noted.
MASTER AND SERVANT-SERVICES AND COMPENSATION-WHETHER OR
NOT EMPLOYEE IS ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS
FOR PERIOD BETWEEN TERMINATION OF STRIKE AND TIME WHEN RECALLED
TO WORK-By a per curiam opinion in the case of American Steel Foun-
dries v. Gordon,' the Illinois Supreme Court has held that employees are
not eligible to draw unemployment compensation benefits for the period,
following the termination of a strike, during which they are prevented
from returning to work by the necessity of bringing the plant into operat-
ing condition and the making of repairs occasioned by the strike. The
facts were such in the case in question that it was physically impossible
to put the plant into normal operating condition for at least fifteen days
after the strike had been settled. Claims for unemployment compensa-
tion benefits made by the employees who were unable to work during this
period had been allowed by the Director of Labor and had been affirmed
by the circuit court, but the holding therein was reversed by the Supreme
Court on further review. 2 The court was called upon to interpret that
section of the statute which provides that workmen shall be ineligible for
benefits for any week with respect to which it is found that their "un-
employment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor
dispute." It reasoned that, while the act required that the stoppage of
7 See Chicago Bar Association v. Kellog, 401 Ill. 375, 82 N. E. (2d) 639 (1948).
8 People v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N. E. (2d) 693 (1948) ; People v. Goodman,
366 Ill. 346, 8 N. E. (2d) 941 (1937) ; People v. Securities Discount Corp., 361 Ill.
551, 198 N. E. 681 (1935); People v. Real Estate Tax Payers Ass'n, 354 Ill. 102,
187 N. E. 823 (1933) ; People v. Peoples' Stock Yards Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E.
901 (1931) ; People v. Munson, 319 Ill. 596, 150 N. E. 280 (1925) ; People v. Hubbard,
313 Ill. 346, 145 N. E. 93 (1924) ; People v. Schreiber, 250 Ill. 345, 95 N. E. 189
(1911) ; People v. Barasch, 338 Ill. App. 169, 86 N. E. (2d) 868 (1949) ; Smith v.
Illinois Adjustment Finance Co., 326 Ill. App. 654, 63 N. E. (2d) 264 (1945).
1404 Ill. 174, 88 N. E. (2d) 465 (1949).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 230, authorizes direct appeal to the Supreme
Court.
3 Ibid., Ch. 48, § 223(d).
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work exist because of a labor dispute, it did not require that the labor
dispute should still exist or be in active progress and it was sufficient that
the unemployment in question stemmed therefrom. Neither the stoppage
of work nor the resulting ineligibility is, therefore, limited in its duration
by the period of duration of the labor dispute itself. The court appears
to have followed what would seem to be a slender majority rule on the
subject, the existence of which has heretofore been noted.
4
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-GOVERNMENTAL POWVERS AND FUNCTIONS
IN GENERAT-WHETHER OR NOT A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION MAY EXERCISE
ExTRA-TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION WHEN REGULATING THE SALE AND Dis-
TRIBUTION OF MILK WITHIN THE MtimnPALITY-Two decisions by the
Illinois Supreme Court, in Dean Milk Companj v. City of Waukegan"
and in Dean Milk Company v. City of Aurora,2 form the most recent
enunciation in this state of a limitation which has been recognized to
exist and which binds municipal corporations in the exercise of their
delegated powers. In each case, the company filed a complaint seeking a
declaration of invalidity of such portions of the milk ordinances of the
two cities concerned as purported to regulate the production and pasteur-
ization of milk outside the corporate boundaries. In the first case, the
milk ordinance provided that no milk or milk product could be sold
within the city unless produced and pasteurized in Lake County, wherein
the city was located. In the second, the ordinance operated to exclude
from sale or distribution within the city, unless labelled "not graded and
not inspected" by the health officer of the municipality, of all milk pro-
duced and pasteurized in plant areas not located within a twenty-five
mile radius of the city limits. Decisions in both cases favoring the plain-
tiff were certified to the Supreme Court because of the public interest
involved.3 In the disposition of both cases, the Supreme Court stated that
municipal corporations do not possess any extra-territorial jurisdiction
beyond that which is expressly or impliedly granted to them by statute.
4
4 See Ablondi v. Board of Review, - N. J. -, 73 A. (2d) 262 (1950) ; Carnegie
Ill. Steel Corp. v. The Review Board, 117 Ind. App. 379, 72 N. E. (2d) 662 (1947) ;
Saunders v. Maryland Unemp. Comp. Board, 188 Md. 677, 53 A. (2d) 579 (1947),
noted in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 180. Contra: Amer. Steel & Wire Co. of
N. J. v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review, 161 Pa. Super. 622, 56 A. (2d) 288 (1948).
1403 Ill. 597, 87 N. E. (2d) 751 (1949).
2404 Ill. 331, 88 N. E. (2d) 827 (1949).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199(1).
4 The one-half mile limit on extra-territorial jurisdiction, conferred by fl1. Rev.
Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 8-1, had been held insufficient to support the milk
ordinance involved in Higgins v. City of Galesburg, 401 Ill. 87, 81 N. E. (2d) 520
(1948).
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While the court expressed the belief that the ordinance provisions might
well facilitate and economize the procedure for exercising regulatory
power over the sale and distribution of milk, it felt constrained to hold
that the ordinance provisions were predicated upon an unlawful assump-
tion of power.
The legal basis for implied limitation upon municipal exercise of
extra-territorial jurisdiction may be found in two early cases 5 which cases
received amplification in the foundational case of City of Rockford v.
Hey.6  The doctrine therein became more firmly entrenched by the addi-
tion of the decisions in Dean Milk Company v. City of Chicago7 and in
Higgins v. City of Galesburg,8 which added support to the limitation by
sporadic decisions construing and applying it to differing instances. The
present cases add still more evidence that municipalities possess only a
local right of regulation which cannot traverse the fixed boundaries of
municipal areas. It is evident, however, that there is need for a more
extended jurisdiction if the number of such milk ordinances, as well as
the attacks being made thereon, are any indication on the subject. The
matter rapidly approaches the point where legislative attention to the
question seems desirable.
TAXATION-LEGACY, INHERITANCE, AND TRANSFER TAXES--WHETHER
A DEvrSE ADOPTED AFTER REACHNG MAJoPRITY IS ENTITLED TO BENEFIT
OF HIGHEST EXEMPTION AND LOWEST RATE OF INHERITANCE TAx-In the
case of McLaughlin v. People,1 the Illinois Supreme Court was asked to
construe a provision of the Illinois Inheritance Tax Act which declares
that the class of persons to whom the highest exemption and the lowest tax
rate shall apply comprises "any child or children legally adopted. ,2 The
county court had there entered a final order and judgment assessing the
inheritance tax on the basis that the devisee was a stranger, unrelated to
the decedent, thus making applicable the lowest possible exemption and
the highest possible rate of tax. It appeared that the decedent had, some
six months prior to death, legally adopted the devisee, then forty-eight
years old, by a valid decree of a Connecticut court. On appeal from that
5 Straus v. Town of Pontiac, 40 Ill. 301 (1866) ; Kiel v. City of Chicago, 176 Ill.
137, 52 N. E. 29 (1898).
6 366 Ill. 526, 9 N. E. (2d) 317 (1937). See also City of Chicago v. Brent, 356 Ill.
40, 190 N. E. 97 (1934), and City of Des Plaines v. Boeckenhaur, 383 Ill. 475, 50
N. E. (2d) 483 (1943).
7 385 Ill. 565, 53 N. E. (2d) 612 (1944).
8 401 Ill. 87, 81 N. E. (2d) 520 (1948).
1403 Ill. 493, 87 N. E. (2d) 637 (1949).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 375(5).
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decision, the legal question presented was one as to whether or not a person
adopted by a valid decree of a state other than Illinois was to be deemed
a "child . . . legally adopted" within the purview of the Illinois statute
even though such person could not have been validly adopted in this state
because he had attained his majority at the time of the adoption. 3 It was
held that the action of the state legislature, when it had amended the
language of the Inheritance Tax Act by striking from it the words "any
child or children adopted as such in conformity with the laws of the
State of Illinois" and substituting the present phrase, 4 had evidenced a
deliberate design to bring about a change in the law so as to make available
to all persons legally adopted under the laws of any jurisdiction, whether
such laws were similar to those of Illinois or not, the benefits of the lowest
tax rate and the highest exemption. The decision clearly conforms to the
mandate of the case of People v. Snyder,' wherein it was stated that, if
there is doubt as to the meaning of statutory language used in delineating
classes of persons and applicable tax rates, the construction should be in
favor of the taxpayer. It should be noted, however, that a mere colorable
compliance with the adoption laws of another state will probably prove
insufficient to secure the benefits of the tax reduction.
WILLS-CONSTRUTION-WHETHER OR NOT BEQUEST OF MONEY ON
DEPOSIT INCLUDES MONEY CONTAINED IN TESTATOR'S SAFETY DEPOSIT Box
LOCATED IN THE VAULT OF A BANKING INSTITUTION-The facts in the case
of Lavin v. Banks' disclose that the testator bequeathed to his wife, among
other things, all "monies on deposit in my name in any bank or banking
institution." Testator had deposit accounts in two banks but also had a
safety deposit box, containing a substantial sum in cash, located in a vault
operated by a safe deposit company which was a wholly-owned subsidiary
of still another banking institution. The widow's claim that such cash
in the safety deposit box passed to her by reason of the bequest aforesaid
was contested by the testator's heirs at law who filed a suit to construe
the will. A trial court decree against the widow was reversed by the
Appellate Court for the First District when that court concluded that a
3 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 1-1. The present statute makes reference to a petition
for leave to adopt a "minor" child but does not specifically forbid the adoption of
adults. In Bartholow v. Davies, 276 Ill. 505, 114 N. E. 1017 (1917), the court,
construing an earlier statute, held that the legislature intended the words "child"
and "children" as used therein, to mean "minor child" and "minor children"
respectively.
4 Laws 1919, p. 757.
5 353 Ill. 184, 187 N. E. 158, 88 A. L. R. 1012 (1933).
1338 Ill. App. 612, 88 N. E. (2d) 512 (1949). Leave to appeal has been granted.
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liberal construction of the will, made necessary because the legatee was
the testator's widow, 2 led to the belief that it was the testator's intention
to pass all money to the legatee since the average testator would not dis-
criminate between a banking institution and a wholly-owned subsidiary
operating a vault in the basement of the banking premises.
3
Ordinarily, a testator's reasonable conclusion as to the meaning of
the words he has used in his will would not serve to influence a court
called on to construe such will. Even if the testator has made a mistake,
so long as he knows and approves the contents of his will, such mistake
will be immaterial as would also be the case if he mistook the legal effect
of the language used or had acted upon mistaken advice of counsel. 4 In
the absence of any controlling special statute, the safe deposit business is
deemed to be governed by statutes relating to Warehousing rather than
those relating to banking operations, for the operators thereof are re-
garded as warehousemen and not as bankers.5 The typical arrangement
between the proprietor of the safety deposit vault and the box renter is
that of bailee and bailor.6  If such is the case, the contents of the box
could not be said to be "on deposit" in the ordinary sense of the term,
unless the court herein is willing to grant that there is a difference in the
relationship which arises between the customer and a non-banking safety
deposit vault, on the one hand, and that which exists between the cus-
tomer and his bank ,or its wholly-owned subsidiary, on the other, when he
utilizes vault facilities for the protection of his cash or other valuables. It
is doubted that there is any such difference, hence the construction placed
on the words used in the will in question does not appear to be warranted.
2 See 69 C. J., Wills, § 1151.
3 As further evidence for that belief, the court pointed out that Ill. Rev. Stat.
1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 114, § 334 et seq., which regulates the keeping and letting of safety
deposit vaults, is expressly declared inapplicable to state and national banks,
whose vaults are deemed to be an integral part of the business of banking.
4 Elam v. Phariss, 289 Mo. 209, 232 S. W. 693 (1921) ; Leonard v. Stanton, 93 N. H.
112, 36 A. (2d) 271 (1944) ; In re Gluckman's Will, 87 N. J. Eq. 638, 101 A. 295
(1917). In McKee v. Collinson, 292 Ill. 458 at 461, 127 N. E. 92 at 93 (1920), the
court quoted from the decision in Decker v. Decker, 121 Ill. 341, 12 N. E. 750 (1887),
to the effect that, as the statute requires a will to be in writing, courts of chancery
have no power to add to or reform a will on grounds of mistake.
5 State v. Kelsey, 53 N. J. L. 590, 22 A. 342 (1891) ; Guarantee & Trust Co. v.
Rector, 76 N. J. L. 87, 75 A. 931 (1910). See also National Safe Deposit Co. v.
Stead, 250 Ill. 584, 95 N. E. 973 (1911).
6 Shoeman v. Temple Safety Deposit Vaults, 189 Ill. App. 316 (1914). Such is
also the case where the box is in a bank, the latter being a bailee for hire, accord-
ing to Framheim v. Miller, 241 Ill. App. 328 (1926).
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WILLS--PROBATE, ESTABLISHMENT, AND ANNULMENT-WHETHER A
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, SUBSEQUENTLY APPOINTED, MAY INSTITUTE A
WILL CONTEST PROCEEDING IN PLACE OF THE DECEASED HEm AFTER THE
PERIOD OF LIMITATION FIXED BY STATUTE FOR SUCH ACTIONS HAS PASSED-
In Kessler v. Martinson,' the administratrix of an heir at law attempted
to contest the will of the testatrix some fourteen months after that will
had been admitted to probate. It appeared that the heir had died approx-
imately seven months after probate had been granted but administration
on the heir's estate had not been authorized until shortly before the will
contest action was filed. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint
because it had not been filed within the nine-month period after probate
fixed by statute.2  That motion having been sustained, the plaintiff ap-
pealed contending that the limitation period of said statute had to be
construed with Section 20 of the Limitations Act3 which allows the legal
representative an additional year in which to bring an action belonging to
a person who dies before the expiration of the time within which he might
have brought suit. The Appellate Court, however, affirmed the order of
dismissal.
As the power of a court of equity to set aside a will is purely statu-
tory, being unknown to the common law, it has been said that such power
can be exercised only in the manner and within the limitations prescribed
by the statute which creates the right.4  There being no vested right to
bring a will contest,5 the time limit set by the statute becomes an element
of jurisdiction,6 which cannot be waived7 for it forms an inherent part
of the substantive right and is not merely a period of limitation. Such
being the case, the statute cannot be enlarged by a saving clause in a
general limitation statute. In the somewhat analogous case of Masin v.
Bassford,9 the Illinois Supreme Court had held that a conservator of an
incompetent heir was barred from maintaining a will contest proceeding
on behalf of the incompetent after the expiration of the nine-month
1339 Ill. App. 207, 89 N. E. (2d) 735 (1949).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 242.
S Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 20. The additional one-year period is measured from the
date of death and not from the date of the appointment of the legal representative.
4 McQueen v. Connor, 385 Il1. 455, 53 N. E. (2d) 435 (1944).
G Sharp v. Sharp, 213 Ill. 332, 72 N. E. 1058 (1905).
6 Clowry v. Nolan, 221 Ill. 458, 77 N. E. 906 (1906) ; Storrs v. St. Luke's Hospital,
180 Ill. 368, 54 N. E. 185 (1899) ; Harvey v. Wilson, 198 Ill. App. 477 (1916).
7 Waters v. Waters, 225 Ill. 559, S0 N. E. 337 (1907).
8 For a discussion of statutes which create rights not existing at common law in
which time has been made an inherent element to the exercise of the right, see
Smith v. Toman, 368 Ill. 414, 14 N. E. (2d) 478, 118 A. L. R. 924 (1938).
9381 Ill. 569, 46 N. E. (2d) 366 (1943).
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period.'" The present case goes one step farther in this strict construc-
tion for the administratrix in the instant case had no power to act until
some months after the right of contest had been lost whereas the con-
servator in the case mentioned had had ample time in which to sue.
Despite this, it seems safe to conclude that will contests constitute one
area in which no delay will be tolerated.1
WORKMEN 'S COMPENSATION-PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION AND CoM-
PLIANCE WITH AWARD-WHETHER OR NOT VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS MADE BY
EMPLOYER TO EMPLOYEE MAY BE TREATED AS PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION
DUE EMPLOYEE UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-In the case of
Olney Seed Company, Inc. v. Industrial Commission,' the Illinois Supreme
Court had to decide whether voluntary payments made by an employer to
an employee, under a general policy of paying all help for time lost due to
illness or accident, could be considered as compensation payments so as
to allow the employer to deduct the amount thereof from a subsequent
award of workmen's compensation. The employee had strained himself
while lifting some bulky machinery, had been referred to the company
doctor, and had been given treatment for a hernia over a period of weeks.
During this time, the employee was absent from work but was paid his
full weekly salary. Upon his return to work, the employee was obliged to
perform lighter duties but continued to draw the same salary. He sub-
sequently filed an application for adjustment of his claim, maintaining
that the payment of wages during his absence was a voluntary and a
gratuitous act on the part of the employer, performed without reference
to any liability arising under the workmen's compensation statute. The
employer contended that, as the wages were paid with knowledge of the
accident and without denial of liability, they constituted payment on
account of the compensation. An award of compensation made by the
arbitrator and sustained by the commission was confirmed by the circuit
court.
On proceedings in error, the Supreme Court, relying on Marshall
Field & Co. v. Industrial Commission,2 ruled that where payments are
10 Prior to the present statute, incompetents and infants had until one year after
the removal of their respective disabilities in which to contest a will: Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1935, Ch. 148, § 7. See also James, Ill. Probate Act. Anno., § 90, p. 93 et seq.
11 Horner, Probate Practice and Estates, § 90, p. 109 et seq.
1403 Ill. 587, 88 N. E. (2d) 24 (1949).
2 305 Ill. 134, 137 N. E. 121 (1922). The claim for compensation there involved
was filed within six months after the last payment of wages but beyond the ordinary
period allowed for the filing of claims. Inasmuch as the wage payments had been
made with knowledge of the injury and without denial of liability, the court held
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made by an employer to his employee with full knowledge of the em-
ployee's accidental injury and without denial of liability under the act,
such wage payments are to be considered as payments upon any com-
pensation which may subsequently be awarded. While the Marshall Field
case had merely decided that voluntary wage payments made by the
employer could serve to toll the limitation period prescribed by Section
24 of the act,3 the court in the instant case stated that the act of the
employer in paying wages should be uniformly construed for all pur-
poses.4  As a consequence, the order for the award was reversed. This
extension of the doctrine of the Marshall Field case, which had served to
aid the employee, now operates to accord equal treatment to the em-
ployer. If, by making payments, he is to be held to have waived the limi-
tation period, he should, by the same token, receive credit for the pay-
ments so made.
that the claim was filed in apt time. It was said, in United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Industrial Commission, 364 Ill. 346 at 349, 4 N. E. (2d) 487 at 488 (1936), by way
of further explanation, that the "rule is based upon the doctrine that when the
employer has knowledge of the Injury and does not deny liability, the employee has
a right to regard the payments as having been made under the act and is not bound
to make demand for further compensation as long as the payments are continued."
See also Tyler v. Industrial Commission, 364 Ill. 381, 4 N. E. (2d) 637 (1936).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 161.
4 The voluntary character of the payment was evidenced by the testimony of the
employer's manager who, when asked why the wages had been paid, answered:
"We have a policy down there . . . that we pay everybody, no matter if they are
sick they get straight time. If they are hurt they get straight time ... and we take
what the insurance company pays them. They don't lose a cent." See 403 Ill. 587 at
592, 88 N. E. (2d) 24 at 26.
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COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A Study of Judicial Review as an Instrument
of Popular Government. Edward S. Corbin. New York: Peter Smith,
reprinted by arrangement with Princeton University Press, 1950. Pp.
xi, 273.
MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS. Henry Steele Commager. New
York: Peter Smith, reprinted by arrangement with the author, 1950.
Pp. 82.
These two reprints, the original of the first having appeared in 1938,
the second in 1943, have been issued by the same publisher to overcome a
scarcity brought about by limited printing and steady demand.' The
occasion for bracketing the two together, however, lies not so much in the
identity of the publisher of these reprints as the similarity of the message
delivered by each, to wit: the asserted power of the United States Supreme
Court to serve as final arbiter of constitutional doctrines is neither a claim
to be justified nor a performance to be applauded.
Professor Corwin's thesis, advanced more than once and in a variety
of forms, contrasts the juristic doctrine of constitutionality of law, leading
to supremacy of the judicial department, with the political or depart-
mental one under which each of the co-ordinate branches of the govern-
ment is to determine for itself the constitutionality of its own acts with
ultimate resort, if required, to the forum of public opinion. Put more
briefly, it is a developed contrast between Jefferson's and Marshall's ideas
of the nature of the federal government with emphasis on the former's
concepts. An appendix, containing certain of the "Letters of Brutus"
which were published in 1788 by way of exposition of parts of the pro-
posed constitution, offers a welcome antithesis to such of the Federalist
papers bearing on the topic as came from Hamilton's pen.
Much the same critical argument has been advanced by Professor
Commager, but his thesis is built around an expression of Mr. Justice
Frankurter in the Flag Salute cases, one to the effect that personal free-
dom is best maintained by ingrained habits rather than by the coercion
of adjudicated law. That thesis is developed, after a fairly extended but
similar contrast between the Jefferson and Marshall concepts of court
I At the time of original issue, Corwin's book was reviewed in 27 Calif. L. Rev.
365, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1033, 51 Jurid. Rev. 189, 55 Law Quarterly 466, 1 La. L. Rev.
866, 62 N. J. Law Journ. 88, 13 Temp. L. Q. 405, 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 754, and 24
Wash.U. L. Q. 612. Comments on "Majority Rule and Minority Rights" appear in
32 Calif. L. Rev. 111, 44 Col. L. Rev. 586, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 389, and 53 Yale L. J. 377.
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supremacy, through a consideration of the judicial decisions bearing on
minority rights. As interpreted by the author, these decisions would
reveal that the United States Supreme Court has done little to advance
minority interests, except in favor of a privileged few, until the court
was forced so to do by the pressure of public opinion reflected through the
electorate. Even then, according to the author, the court has been slow
to react.
Retreat from the concept of judicial supremacy is not likely at this
late date, hence Professor Corwin tends to whistle in the teeth of the
wind. For that matter, Professor Commager is not likely to make any
converts. Is it not possible that the mere existence of so immobile a
tribunal, now that it is vested with acknowledged power, has, in itself,
been a saving feature? Acting as a potential and impending brake, may
its presence not have operated to save the democratic form of govern-
ment from even worse excesses which might have been perpetrated by
majority on minority groups? Self-education in the "abandonment of
foolish legislation," as worked out between the Eighteenth and the
Twenty-first Amendments, may well serve to train a majority in the real
meaning of liberty. Yet there is occasion for a stern schoolmaster to
prompt an unwilling pupil to recognize the need for that education. Few
Americans, considering the current level of worship for the Constitution,
would have it otherwise.
FIvE JEWISH LAWYERS OF THE COMMON LAW. Arthur L. Goodhart. Lon-
don: Oxford University Press, 1949. Pp. 74.
Professor Goodhart's ability as a lecturer is a commonplace matter of
fact open to any one who may have heard, or ever read, his discourse
entitled "English Contributions to the Philosophy of Law."' Added
evidence of his skill may be found in the printed record of still another
lecture, one delivered in 1947 in honor of the late Lucien Wolf, founder
and long-time president of the Jewish Historical Society of England, but
which speech has now, for the first time, been revised, documented and
placed in permanent format. Reflecting, as it does, the interests with
which Lucien Wolf was associated, the lecture speaks, without chauvinism,
of five leaders of the Anglo-American bar and judiciary who attained a
fitting eminence in the field of law, two as advocates and three as judges.
The clarity of these five biographical profiles, for each is necessarily
but a brief sketch, admirably provides the reader with the essence of each
1 A review thereof appears in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 342-3.
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subject skilfully distilled from more voluminous materials. The funda-
mental liberalism displayed by these men, the depth of their scholarship,
their courage, their indefatigable industry, mark them not so much as
prominent Jews but as honorable men of law. Is there need to guess at
their names ? Five such as Judah P. Benjamin, Sir George Jessel, Louis
D. Brandeis, Rufus Isaacs, and Benjamin N. Cardozo would grace any
country or ennoble any profession.
LAW OF PARTNERSHIP. Ludwig Teller. New York: Harmon Publica-
tions, 1949. Pp. xvii, 197.
CORPORATIONS. Ludwig Teller. New York: Harmon Publications, 1949.
Pp. xviii, 228.
A practicing lawyer, unless in need of a hasty refresher as to the
law, would pass these slim volumes by as being scarcely worthy of his
attention despite their claim to broad examination into the common law
principles underlying the subjects covered, as supplemented by reference
to applicable statutory law. Certainly, what takes up volumes in monu-
mental works in the field, as for example Fletcher on Corporations, cannot
be compressed into a handful of pages no matter how skillful the author.
As simple texts of the more obvious phases of the law, suitable for student
use, these works might pass muster, but even then they possess deficiencies.
It is true that most of the important phases of the two subjects are touched
upon, but little is said, in the book on corporations, as to the rights of
corporate creditors in case of insolvency and there is no treatment of
issues growing out of attempts at reorganization. The twelve pages de-
voted to contrasting other forms of business organization, not with the
corporate set-up but with each other, might well have been omitted as
irrelevant and instead pieced out with a discussion of the operation of
Chapter X of the Chandler Act. The partnership volume, like any other
condensation, is little more than a stepping stone to what could be a much
more thorough study of the subject. Both books possess the merit of
logical organization, but to the extent that such organization parallels that
already adopted by standard casebooks on the subject there is some occa-
sion to believe that the preparation of these books was dictated more by
a desire to provide a set of "canned" briefs for student use than to com-
pile workable texts for the practitioner. The presence of a set of simple
questions and answers in the partnership book, based on material out-
lined in the text, tends to confirm that belief.
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LAWYERS' TAX MANUAL. Alfred S. Pellard. New York: Clark Boardman
Company, Ltd., 1949. Pp. xxiii, 582.
If, as Webster suggests, a manual is a "small book, such as may
be carried in the hand," the title to this work is slightly on the side of
misnomer. If, however, the word has acquired a secondary meaning, for
example a book which may be "handled conveniently," then the title
for this publication is highly appropriate. It is, note the word, for
"lawyers," not tax experts; it deals with federal taxation; but, above
all, it provides convenient access to the manifold tax problems which
surround every legal transaction of consequence. Substantive tax
aspects affecting wills, trusts, estates, gifts, insurance, partnerships, cor-
porations, real estate transfers, installment sales, as well as alimony and
separate maintenance payments, are considered. Tax procedures, whether
before the Collector, the Department, the Commissioner, or the courts,
are explained. The work-day job of draftsmanship is made easy by
specimen forms, forms which range from the simple power of attorney
to the complicated trust agreement. Added features, such as a table of
common abbreviations, an appendix setting forth the Rules of Prac-
tice before the Tax Court, and detailed indices, supply further aids to
convenient handling. It is a "desk book" which should be in every
lawyer's office.
LIVING LAW OF DEMOcRATic SOCIETY. Jerome Hall. Indianapolis, Indiana:
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1949. Pp. 146.
Strange books pass, at times, across the reviewer's desk. This one,
however, may be said to be the strangest, the most incomprehensible
one produced in many years. The book was intended to convey a message,
for the author's preface states: "I have tried in this small book to
make a contribution to legal philosophy." The author is capable of
making such a contribution, for he has long been a distinguished professor
of law, a prolific writer on legal topics, and a member of many learned
organizations. But the performance, when measured in terms of the
impression created in the mind of the reader, is worse than negative.
The author must have anticipated that these lectures, given at Pa-
cific University in 1947 and since revised, would be made the subject
of adverse criticism, for he wrote that the book would probably invite
"attack from certain specialists on the ground that what I have written
is ideology, not science." The book may so be vulnerable, but if it is,
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the attack must come from others. This reviewer merely states that
what has been written by the author is not English but some form of
scientific jargon. One sentence will serve to support that indictment.
On page 144, for example, appears this gem of expression: "The cur-
rent epistemologic scene ranges from the total idealism of phenomenology
to the complete externalism of operationalism." Other, and equally
abstruse statements could be quoted, if necessity arose, but there is
no occasion to belabor the point.
When Professor Hall condescends to put his thoughts into read-
able Anglo-American prose, he may find converts for his ideas. Until
then, most persons will believe he has, in fact, dealt not with ideology but
with some form of gibberish, a species of unmeaningful double-talk
linked to a pseudo-science.
MATEILs ON ACCOUNTING. Robert Amory, Jr., Brooklyn, New York:
The Foundation Press, Inc., 1949. Pp. xxiii, 781.
The rudiments underlying a system of bookkeeping are something
easily acquired, for no student in a law school, much less a practicing
lawyer, has been able to avoid contact with mathematics in some form,
even if that contact has provided no more than a knowledge of simple
arithmetic. Both student and lawyer, therefore, possess the beginning
skills necessary to understand the technique of accounting practices. But,
as the author of this book on materials on accounting wisely notes, if
the work of the accountant was limited to assembling and arranging
figures and no more, his services would be skilled in character but hardly
approximating the level of professional art. When the accountant goes
beyond bookkeeping mechanics and deals with policy and judgment ques-
tions, however, he ceases to be a technician and becomes the valued pro-
fessional adviser of business. It is then that he comes into contact with
law and the courts, for no business concern accepting his guidance in
this regulated and tax-ridden era can hope to operate for long without
one eye on production and the other on the legal consequences of its
activity. Here, then, is where the lawyer needs true accounting training
for he must, to serve his clients well, be able to understand as well as
to appreciate what the accounting adviser is offering by way of an-
swer to such policy and judgment questions. The instant work, unlike
most books on so-called "legal accounting," tackles the problem of pro-
viding a solid theoretical grounding in accounting principles, as well
as practices, so that the lawyer may understand the only universal lan-
guage utilized in an industrial society. It would be erroneous to sup-
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pose a course based on this book would make a law student into a person
prepared to practice accountancy. It would, however, prepare him for
effective collaboration with those who do practice that profession when-
ever their interests should chance to meet. Nor would that student feel
at sea in a strange world, for the book contains a fairly wide range of
cases, many taken from the records of the Tax Court, showing the legal,
and hence to him the practical, application given to the accounting ma-
terials. He would, to say the least, be a wiser person for his study of
its contents.
MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. Edited by Arthur T.
Vanderbilt. New York: The National Conference of Judicial Councils,
1949. Pp. xxxii, 752.
The co-operative efforts of a host of judges, lawyers, and law pro-
fessors throughout the country, working under the guiding genius of an
able editor who prepared a masterly sixteen-page introduction, have re-
sulted in the formulation of a yardstick by which it is now possible to
measure the adequacy of judicial performance in any of the American
jurisdictions. Through text, maps and statistics, the attitude of both
bench and bar toward the minimum standards of judicial administration
recommended by the American Bar Association stands revealed as, by
and large, a deplorable record of inattentiveness. Progress, or lack of
progress, achieved in gaining acceptance for and application of these
recommendations, first made in 1937-8, is charted in black and white.
There is no need, any longer, to guess at the response the bar is making
to turn acknowledged need for reform into accomplished fact. The record
now stands starkly revealed upon the pages of this book. It should serve
to bring the blush of shame to the cheeks of all who serve the law for
their compounding with the unnecessary delays, the needless technicalities,
and the lack of business system which have made the courts, rather than
the law, a matter of reproach, even though that criticism be oft expressed
in humorous vein.
If the average lawyer has endured incompetent judges, unfit jurors,
needlessly complicated practice and inexcusable delays in trial and appeal
as being inescapable vices in the administration of justice, he need only
read this book to realize that forward-looking jurisdictions have begun the
work of reform. If he will not then press for correction of abuses in his
own state, as they are here shown to exist, he must expect that others will
take the work from his hands. The damage which could come from that
action should alone be enough to cause him to want to undertake the task
of moving his own state into the ranks of the enlightened ones.
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SEXUAL DEVIATIONS. Louis S. London, M.D., and Frank S. Caprio, M.D.,
with foreword by Nolan D. C. Lewis, M.D. Washington, D. C.: The
Linacre Press, Inc., 1950. Pp. xviii, 702.
Professor Maclver, writing about a recent book intended as a scientific
study but which attained a considerable notoriety of the scatological type,
said: "We should not be afraid of the truth about human behavior . . .
We all agree that unenlightened guidance is bad where physical health
is concerned. We must learn that it is no less bad when moral health is
the issue." Knowledge concerning the sex impulse and of its more anti-
social deviations, whether those who deviate be called sexual psychopaths
or not, is now available, through this excellent work, to all who have
proper use for such information. Two collaborating psychiatrists have
here brought together a comprehensive reference book, based upon clinical
research into actual case histories, depicting the part psychoanalysis and
other psychiatric devices can play in revealing the motivating forces
which produce sexual deviations as well as the techniques which are
available to restore these pathetic victims to socially acceptable norms.
The reports prepared by the authors clearly indicate that, while the
problems of sexual aberration present a serious challenge, the unconscious
forces responsible are within the reach of science.
Lawmakers, long bogged down with the tragedy of trying to deal
with sexual offenders as criminals, involving only the process of incar-
ceration without cure, may here learn that adequate psychiatric treatment
can provide the only satisfactory remedy. Lawyers concerned over rising
divorce rates may here find solution for much of the seeming mis-mating
which leads to marital disharmony. Penologists, faced with the incidence
of homosexual practices among inmates of prisons, may also discover, with
profit, the modern answer to an ancient problem. Against the possibility
that technical writing may confuse the uninitiated reader, an excellent
glossary as well as an extended bibliography accompanies the volume.
Its message is one that should not be neglected.
TAX PLANNING FoR ESTATES. William J. Bowe. Nashville, Tennessee:
Vanderbilt University Press, 1949. Pp. 93.
It has been suggested that not the least difficult problem in estate
planning is that of surmounting the incipient inertia of testators. By
writing this slender volume, Professor Bowe has done yeoman service in
making readily available a number of the convincing reasons for the
taking of immediate action. In a lucid and stimulating fashion, the author
discusses the significant impact of taxation on each phase of estate plan-
ning. To be sure, one must not lose sight of all else in the effort to avoid
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taxation, but without doubt taxation is now, and increasingly will be, a
substantial consideration in any estate plan.
The book is not intended as a comprehensive treatment of the tech-
nical aspects of this field.1 It is, rather, a provocative discussion of the
sundry problems one must consider in preparation for any estate analysis.
Numerous examples of useful devices are suggested by which one may
avoid expensive pitfalls while, at the same time, one makes available to
succeeding generations the greatest amount of property possible. It is
submitted that, on occasion, the author may have sacrificed accuracy in
his examples for the purpose of simplification, but unquestionably each
example provides dramatic emphasis to the main theme. Attorneys, ac-
countants, trust men, as well as others interested in estate planning,
owe it to themselves to read Chapter VIII, entitled "Necessity for Com-
petent Advice," for here in a nutshell are illustrations of the financial
havoc which can beset those who are uninitiated in this esoteric area of
the law. The book, happily, is written in a most readable and engaging
style. This fact, as well as the importance of its content, ought to make
the publication a best seller in its class.
LAW oF TRUSTS. Ralph A. Newman. Brooklyn, New York: The Founda-
tion Press, Inc., 1949. Pp. xi, 452.
If the quality of readableness be the sign of a good book and the
quality of scholarliness the test of a great one, then it may be said that
this short text on the law of trusts falls somewhere between goodness on
the one hand and greatness on the other. Not a little of its value lies in
the fact that it is brief. Despite its apparent size, the extreme width of
page margins, the presence of bibliographical tables and indices totalling
roughly one-seventh of the whole book, and the large size of the type used
therein, all go to reduce the actual compass of the text. But brevity never
bothered law students, for whom such books as these are written, hence it
remains a worth-while addition to the field. Were this no more than a
mere condensation of larger and more standard texts, those for example
prepared by Bogert and Scott, there would be occasion to say little more
than has been said. It is, however, an original work, the author having
sought to inject reason into a context which has, to some extent, lacked
the clarification which may be found in other property subjects. Sharp
scrutiny of the common-law restrictions which have been imposed on
other property doctrines has resulted, as the author states, in bringing
them into sharp focus. By attempting to do much the same thing for the
primary doctrines of trust law, the author has earned deserved praise for
his efforts and commendation for his results.
1 For a full discussion of all of the problems, see Shattuck, An Estate Planner's
Handbook (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1948).
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JIABOR DICTIONARY: A Concise Encyclopedia of Labor Information. P. H.
Casselman. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. Pp. xi, 554.
This book, prepared by a professor of industrial relations at the
University of Ottawa, in Canada, states that the "work is dedicated to
the attainment of industrial peace." The author expresses the feeling
that the book "can make a direct contribution towards better under-
standing between labor and management by defining terms and delineating
fields of discord." It is difficult to see how controversies between man-
agement and labor will be wiped out in this fashion when it is well known
that such disputes are not based on any misunderstanding of terms but
rather by a conflict of economic interests. It is, therefore, suspected that
the high-sounding phrases of the dedication were chosen to furnish an
excuse for a rather trivial work which is neither an indispensable guide,
as the imprint would proclaim, nor of particular usefulness to those in-
terested in and concerned with labor relations.
Employers and union representatives, when dealing with each other,
are quite well aware of, and in agreement with each other, as to the terms
they may use in the give-and-take of collective bargaining. A labor dic-
tionary will not solve their problems nor smooth the road to an easier
understanding. With this large segment of potential users eliminated,
there remains a group of lawyers, teachers, and students who might be
interested in the field of labor relations and labor law. It is doubtful
whether definitions of the type compiled in this dictionary will materially
aid them, for there is no short-cut possible to the intricate web of labor
law. The value of this book, then, seems to be reduced to an absolute
minimum.
